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FUNDAMENTAL CONSUMER RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 68 OF 2008: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
 
W Jacobs   
PN Stoop  
R van Niekerk*** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The controversial1 Consumer Protection Act2 (hereafter the Act) was signed by the 
President of the Republic of South Africa on 29 April 2009 and published in the 
Government Gazette on 29 April 2009.3 The most contentious part of the Act 
concerns the fundamental consumer rights contained in Chapter 2.4 The article (in 
two parts) provides a critical overview of, and comments on, the entire fundamental 
consumer rights provided for in the Act. The discussion on the right to fair, just and 
reasonable terms and conditions (for example, fair contract terms) and the right to 
fair value, good quality and safety (for example, product liability) particularly contain 
detailed critical analysis. This article, in particular, aims to evaluate these rights and 
to establish the extent to which consumer protection, if any, previously provided for 
under the common law, may have been amended or extended by the Act.5 The 
impact of the Act on the legal position of both the consumer and the supplier is also 
analysed. The authors raise many questions in the course of the article, some of 
which remain unanswered. These questions illustrate some of the uncertainties in 
regard to the scope and possible interpretation of fundamental consumer rights and 
prompt the reader to further reflection. 
                                                 
*  Wenette Jacobs. BLC LLB (UP) LLM (UNISA) Dip ADR (UP and AFSA). Senior lecturer, 
Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa (jacobw@unisa.ac.za). 
**  Philip N Stoop. BCom LLB LLM (UP). Senior lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, School of 
Law, University of South Africa (stooppn@unisa.ac.za). 
***  René van Niekerk. BProc LLB LLM (RAU). Senior lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, 
School of Law, University of South Africa (rvanniek@unisa.ac.za).  
1  See Du Preez 2009 TSAR 60–61 for a list of some of the controversial provisions in the 
Consumer Protection Bill of 2008 – hereafter the CPA Bill.  
2  68 of 2008. 
3  See Schedule 2; see Stassen 2009 De Rebus 42–44 for a concise overview of the 
commencement dates of application of the sections of the Act and also see generally Van Eeden 
Guide. 
4  Parts A–I paras 8–67. 
5  See 3 in the article. 
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The reader is cautioned not to study sections of the Act in isolation, as this may 
create a false impression of, for example, the application (or not) of the fundamental 
consumer protection rights. Before turning to a critical evaluation of the fundamental 
consumer rights, it is imperative to analyse the interpretation, purpose and 
application of the Act as set out in Chapter 1.6 A proper understanding of the 
extensive list of definitions7 in the Act plays a central role in determining whether the 
Act (and thereby also the fundamental consumer rights) applies to a transaction.8  
 
The authors assume that the reader will consult the Act in conjunction with the article 
and have therefore attempted to avoid lengthy quotations from the Act. 
 
2 The purpose, interpretation and application of the Act 
 
2.1 Purpose of the Act  
 
Existing consumer protection measures were outdated and fragmented. The 
consumer protection framework had to be reviewed. South Africa needed a 
comprehensive outline to provide a framework of legislation, policies and 
government authorities to regulate consumer-supplier interaction.9 The Act now 
provides an extensive framework for consumer protection and aims to develop, 
enhance and protect the rights of the consumer and to eliminate unethical suppliers 
and improper business practices.10 
 
Certain areas of the common law regarding consumer rights have been codified by 
the Act and certain unfair business practices that were previously unregulated are 
now governed by the Act (see examples in the course of the article). In terms of the 
Act, consumers obtain several new rights and some of the existing rights are 
                                                 
6  Parts A–B paras 1–7. See A 2 in the article. 
7  S 1; also see 2.6 in the article. 
8  Certain parts of or sections in the Act contain their own definitions, eg S 53 in Part H of Chp 2. In 
this regard, see 3.8.1 in the article. 
9  DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 9 GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 
September 2004. 
10  See the Preamble to the Act. 
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broadened and reinforced.11 Therefore, suppliers will have to evaluate whether their 
business practices comply with the Act and make the necessary changes. In some 
instances, drastic measures will have to be implemented (again, see examples in the 
course of the article).  
 
Both the National Credit Act12 and the Consumer Protection Act contain extensive 
consumer rights for the protection of consumers. If a consumer, for example, enters 
into a credit agreement13 with a supplier, the credit agreement is regulated by the 
National Credit Act and any goods so purchased by the Consumer Protection Act.  
 
Section 3 sets out the purpose of the Act, which is to protect and develop the social 
and economic welfare of consumers, in particular vulnerable consumers.14 Section 
3(2) prescribes additional responsibilities for the National Consumer Commission15 
to ensure the realisation of the purposes of the Act. The Commission must take all 
reasonable and practical steps to promote the purposes of the Act to conduct 
research and to propose policies relating to consumer issues to the Minister.16 
Furthermore, an annual report regarding prescribed consumer matters must be sent 
to the Minister. 
 
The Act places mammoth obligations on suppliers and authorities to ensure 
consumer protection. It remains to be seen whether the Act will achieve its purpose 
and be as successful in consumer protection as the National Credit Act has proven 
to be.  
                                                 
11  See, eg, undue influence and duress in 3.6.1 in the article. 
12  34 of 2005. 
13  S 8 National Credit Act.  
14  See S 3(1) of the Act on the ways in which these purposes are to be achieved. S 3(1)(b)(i)–(iv) 
identifies vulnerable consumers as low-income persons or low-income communities who live in 
remote, isolated or low-density population areas or communities; minors, seniors or other 
vulnerable consumers; or those with limited literacy as a target group.  
15  The National Consumer Commission is established in terms of S 85(1). See S 1 sv 
"Commission".  
16  S 1 sv "Minister" means the member of the cabinet responsible for consumer protection.  
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2.2 Interpretation of the Act17 
 
The Act has its own interpretation clause, which provides that it must be interpreted 
in a manner that gives effect to the purposes that are set out in Section 3 of the 
Act.18 When interpreting the Act, applicable foreign law, international law, 
conventions, declarations or protocols may be considered.19 This method of 
interpretation may lead to a result different to that expected when the traditional rules 
of interpretation are applied to ascertain the intention of the legislature, which is the 
main aim of interpretation. Usually, legislation is interpreted according to the ordinary 
grammatical meaning of words,20 but contextual interpretation (namely to interpret 
the meaning that the words have ascertained in their broader legal context in the rest 
of the world) is not unknown to our law. The Act further provides that any decision of 
a consumer court, ombud or arbitrator in terms of this Act that has not been set aside 
by a higher court may also be considered when interpreting the Act. Precedents may 
thus be created if a consumer court, ombud or arbitrator interprets the Act. 
 
Section 2(3) provides for the use of electronic signatures in cases in which the Act 
requires signatures or initialling.  
 
Sections 2(8) and 2(9) prescribe rules in cases of conflict between the Act and other 
legislation. Should there be an inconsistency between any provisions of Chapter 5 of 
this Act (which deals with national consumer protection institutions) and the Public 
Finance Management Act21 or the Public Service Act,22 the last-mentioned Acts will 
apply. In other instances in which there is an inconsistency between any provisions 
of the Act and other legislation, the provisions of both acts will apply concurrently to 
the extent that it is possible. If it is not possible to apply the provisions of the Acts 
                                                 
17  S 2. 
18  S 2(1). 
19  S 2(2). 
20  This is in terms of the literal interpretation principle, which is firmly entrenched in our law (see 
934J; also see Botha Wetsuitleg 14–15 and De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
94 et seq). On contextual interpretation, see Botha Wetsuitleg 11–15 and De Ville Constitutional 
and Statutory Interpretation 238–241. 
21  1 of 1999. 
22  103 of 1994. 
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concurrently, the provision that extends the greater protection to consumers must 
prevail. 
 
2.3 The realisation and enforcement of consumer rights23 
 
The following persons have locus standi to approach a court, the Tribunal or the 
Commission and allege that their rights in terms of this Act have been infringed:24  
 
(a) a person acting on his/her own behalf:25 
(b) an authorised person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in 
his/her own name;26 
(c) a person acting as a member of a group or class of affected persons;27 
(d) a person acting in the public interest with leave from the Tribunal or court;28 
(e) an association acting in the interest of all its members (membership of 
associations includes club memberships).29 
 
Section 38(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution), makes provision for a group or class of persons to approach a court in 
cases in which there has been an infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights.30 The 
Act also makes provision for class actions in Section 4(1)(c). A member of a group or 
class of affected persons who seeks redress for infringement of his, her or their 
rights may institute action against a particular supplier. Should the class action be 
successful, all members of a group or class may benefit from the settlement or 
award. Class actions are to the benefit of individual consumers who do not have the 
ability or financial means to institute action against a supplier. However, class 
actions may have major and adverse implications on suppliers' finances and public 
image. Suppliers therefore need sufficient liability insurance. 
                                                 
23  S 4 and 69. 
24  S 4(1). The Tribunal is established in terms of S 26 of the National Credit Act to conclude 
hearings and to deal with various consumer matters. 
25  S 4(1)(a). 
26  S 4(1)(b). 
27  S 4(1)(c). 
28  S 4(1)(d). 
29  S 4(1)(e). 
30  See Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E) 
and Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 3 SA 925 (CC), in which 
the court dealt with various issues relating to class actions. 
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In terms of Section 4(2), the Tribunal or a court has an obligation to develop the 
common law to the extent that it improves the realisation and enjoyment of consumer 
rights in a general sense, and specifically those rights of vulnerable consumers. 
Furthermore, a Tribunal or a court must promote the spirit and purposes of the Act.31 
Should any part of the Act be construed to have more than one meaning, the 
Tribunal or court is obliged to interpret it in a way that promotes the purposes of this 
Act and improves the realisation of consumer rights, especially the rights of 
vulnerable consumers.32 
 
Section 4(4) prescribes rules to be followed when interpreting any contracts, forms or 
documents prepared by a supplier or on his, her or its behalf. In cases in which 
ambiguities exist or in which consumer rights are limited, interpretation must be to 
the benefit of the consumer. This section confirms, and perhaps even extends, the 
contra proferentem rule33 under the common law. 
 
Section 4(5) is a clause of general application that prohibits certain conduct in the 
ordinary course of business with consumers. The prohibitions include conduct that 
defeats the purposes of the Act, is misleading, or constitutes a false representation 
of facts. 
 
2.4 Enforcement of rights by consumers34 
 
The Act provides for various mechanisms for the enforcement of consumer rights. 
Consumers may seek redress by referring the matter to the Tribunal,35 if the Act 
permits it. Should the supplier be subject to the jurisdiction of an applicable ombud, 
                                                 
31  S 4(2)(a)–(b). 
32  S 4(3). 
33  In terms of the contra proferentem rule in terms of which a document is construed against the 
drafter if ambiguities exist. See Lynn & Main Inc v Brits Community Sandworks CC 2009 1 SA 
308 (SCA) para 24, in which where the court also referred to Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon and Co 
Ltd 1948 3 SA 99 (A) 122.  
34  S 69. 
35  S 69(a). A referral to the Tribunal must be in the prescribed form and manner as provided for in S 
75 of the Act. In matters referred to the Tribunal, a hearing must be conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of the Act and the applicable provisions of the National Credit Act (see 
generally Chp 7 Parts D–E). The Tribunal may make any order provided for in the Act or in the 
relevant sections of the National Credit Act. Hearings before the Tribunal are held in public, are 
as informal as possible and are of inquisitorial nature.  
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the matter may be referred to that ombud.36 Should this not be the case,37 the matter 
may be referred to a provincial consumer court, should one exist, for alternative 
dispute resolution, or a complaint may be lodged with the Commission.38 Should all 
remedies in terms of national legislation have been exhausted, a court of law with 
jurisdiction may be approached.39 This implies that a court of law may not be 
approached, unless a consumer has first approached the Tribunal, ombud, provincial 
consumer court or Commission, or referred the matter to an alternative dispute 
resolution agent. These different enforcement mechanisms may lead to confusion 
and forum-shopping in an instance in which an aggrieved consumer has to choose 
the appropriate forum to seek redress under the Act.40 
 
A court hearing a matter under this Act may order that any conduct that is 
inconsistent with this Act should be changed or stopped or may make an order that 
is specifically provided for in the Act.41 Damages may be awarded, including 
damages to a class of consumers, on any terms and conditions that the court may 
consider to be just and suitable and in accordance with the purposes of the Act.42  
 
Generally, the Act provides for severe penalties and administrative fines for non-
compliance with the Act. It provides for a fine, or imprisonment of a maximum of 
twelve months, or both if a person is convicted of an offence in terms of the Act.43 
When a supplier has disclosed any personal or private information as prohibited in 
Section 107, it provides for a fine, or imprisonment of not longer than ten years, or 
both.44 The severity of these penalties indicates that the legislature regards the 
disclosure of personal information in a very serious light. The Tribunal may impose 
an administrative fine45 that does not exceed the greater of ten per cent of the 
                                                 
36  S 69(b). 
37  S 69(c)(i)–(iii). 
38  The Commission falls outside the public service but is an organ of state in terms of S 85(1). It is 
furthermore a juristic person with jurisdiction throughout South Africa in terms of S 85(2)(a)–(b). 
The Commission must therefore also exercise its functions in accordance with the principles 
listed in S 195 of the Constitution. See S 99 on the enforcement functions of the Commission.  
39  S 69(d). 
40  See Du Preez 2009 TSAR 81. 
41  S 76(1)(a)–(b). 
42  S 76(1)(c). 
43  S 111(1)(b). 
44  S 111(1)(a). 
45  S 112(3)(a)–(g).  
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supplier's annual turnover during the previous financial year46 or R1 million47 for 
prohibited or required conduct. 
 
2.5 Application of the Act 
 
One of the aims of the new consumer policy framework is to provide a consistent, 
predictable and effective regulatory framework that fosters consumer confidence in 
the market.48 The scope and field of application of the regulatory framework had to 
be determined. One of the greatest pitfalls in consumer law, prior to the 
commencement of the Act, was the absence of a uniform definition of a 
"consumer".49 Furthermore, to afford the required wide protection to consumers, a 
"consumer" must be defined broadly as an individual who purchases "goods" and 
"services".50  
 
The Act has a wide field of application. The Act applies to every transaction 
occurring within South Africa for the supply of goods or services or the promotion of 
goods or services and the goods or services themselves, unless the transaction is 
exempted from the application of the Act.51 The Act does not apply to the following:  
 
(a) transactions for the supply or promotion of goods or services to the State;52  
(b) transactions in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset 
value or annual turnover, at the time of the transaction, is more than or equal to 
the threshold value determined by the Minister in terms of Section 6;53  
                                                 
46  S 112(2)(a). 
47  S 112(2)(b). 
48  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 para 13. 
49  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 para 25. 
50  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 para 25. 
51  S 5(1)(a)–(d). It is uncertain what the meaning and scope of "occurring within South Africa" are. 
While the Act applies to every transaction "occurring within South Africa", other legislation, such 
as the National Credit Act, applies to transactions "having effect within South Africa". See 2.5–
2.6 in the article, where the enforcement, jurisdictional and choice of law issues that could result 
from Ss 5(5) and 5(8) of the Act are mentioned. 
52  S 5(2)(a). The Act does not contain a definition of "State". It is not clear whether companies and 
other entities, of which the State is a shareholder or member, are included in the definition of 
"State". However, an "organ of state" is defined in S 1 as an organ of state as defined in S 239 of 
the Constitution. 
53  S 5(2)(b). See 2.7 in the article. Ss 4(1)(a)(i), 4(1)(b) and 9(4) of the National Credit Act (read 
with GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006) have the same type of exemption for juristic persons. 
The Consumer Protection Act does not stipulate the manner in which information on a juristic 
person's annual turnover or asset value will be obtained. Furthermore, the differentiation between 
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(c) transactions that have been exempted by the Minister in terms of Sections 5(3) 
and 5(4);54  
(d) transactions that constitute credit agreements under the National Credit Act (the 
goods and services subject to such a credit agreement are not excluded from the 
application of the Act);55  
(e) transactions pertaining to services to be supplied under an employment 
contract;56  
(f) transactions that give effect to a collective bargaining agreement in terms of 
the Labour Relations Act57 and the Constitution,58 or  
                                                                                                                                                        
juristic persons who qualify as consumers and juristic persons who are not protected in terms of 
the Consumer Protection Act should be fair and based on accessible information to avoid 
discrimination. For example, how will the protection of a sole proprietorship-consumer with a very 
large annual turnover be justified if a company with the same annual turnover will not be 
protected in terms of the Consumer Protection Act? And further, does the Consumer Protection 
Act not aim to protect individual consumers rather than businesses? See Stassen De Rebus 43. 
The exception in S 5(2)(b) does not apply to franchises (see S 5(7)). See the discussion of the 
definition of "transaction" in 2.6 for a discussion of the exemption of juristic persons. Also see 2.7 
in the article. 
54  S 5(2)(c). In terms of S 5(3), only a regulatory authority may apply to the Minister for an industry-
wide exemption from one or more provisions of the Act on the basis that the provisions overlap or 
duplicate a regulatory scheme regulated by the authority under national legislation, treaty, 
international law, convention or protocol. Therefore, an individual supplier or a representative 
body may not apply for an exemption from the Act. However, in terms of S 5(4), the Minister may, 
by notice in the Government Gazette, grant an exemption to an industry, after receiving advice 
from the Commission. Such an exemption may only be granted to the extent that the regulatory 
scheme ensures the achievement of the purposes of the Act and its provisions. The exemption 
may be subjected to limits or conditions that are necessary to ensure the achievement of the 
purposes of the Act. 
55  S 5(2)(d). Although this exemption seems to be clear, it is not. The National Credit Act makes 
provision for so-called incidental credit agreements. Incidental credit agreements are credit 
agreements in terms of Ss 1, 5(2) and 8(4)(b) of the National Credit Act. However, an incidental 
credit agreement is only regarded as a credit agreement twenty "business days" (see S 2(5) of 
the National Credit Act) after the supplier of goods or services first charges interest or fees for 
late payment of an account (see Otto National Credit Act Explained 39–40 and Stoop 2008 De 
Jure 357–358). Therefore, during the above-mentioned first twenty business days, an incidental 
credit agreement does not constitute a credit agreement in terms of the National Credit Act. The 
question is then, whether the Consumer Protection Act can apply to an "incidental credit 
agreement" that is not yet a credit agreement in terms of the National Credit Act. Furthermore, 
the Consumer Protection Act only excludes credit agreements in terms of the National Credit Act 
from its ambit. Marketing of credit products in terms of the National Credit Act is not expressly 
excluded from the application of the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, the National Credit Act 
and the Consumer Protection Act should apply to credit advertisements and marketing of credit. 
This leads to a duplication of regulations. The National Credit Regulator could, on behalf of the 
credit industry, apply for an exemption from the marketing provisions of the Consumer Protection 
Act in terms of S 5(3). However, should there be any inconsistency between any provisions of 
the Consumer Protection Act and other legislation, the provisions of both Acts apply concurrently 
to the extent that it is possible. Should it not be possible to apply the provisions of the Acts 
concurrently, the provisions that extend the greater protection to consumers must prevail (S 2(9) 
of the Consumer Protection Act).  
56  S 5(2)(e). It is not clear whether this exemption includes temporary employment contracts, but 
one could accept that all employment contracts are covered by this exemption. 
57  66 of 1995. 
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(g) a collective agreement in terms of Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act.59  
 
Furthermore, advice or intermediary banking or related financial service, or the 
undertaking, underwriting or assumption of risk, is excluded from the definition of 
"service" in Section 1 to the extent that the service is regulated by the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act60 or the Long-term Insurance Act61 or Short-
term Insurance Act.62 It follows that such a service is therefore excluded from the 
application of the Act.63  
 
However, if goods are supplied within South Africa in terms of a transaction that are 
exempted from the application of the Act, such goods (and the importer or producer, 
distributor and retailer of those goods) are still subject to Sections 60 and 61 that 
deal with unsafe goods, safety-monitoring, recall and damage caused by such 
goods. Where a juristic person, for example, does not qualify as a consumer, 
Sections 60 and 61 will apply to the goods purchased by it and to the supplier of the 
goods.64  
 
2.6 Definitions 
 
In order to determine the field of application of the Act, the most important definitions 
given in Section 5 of the Act should be analysed. As stated above, the Act applies to 
every transaction occurring within South Africa for the supply of goods or services or 
the promotion of goods or services and the goods or services themselves, unless the 
transaction is exempted.65 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
58  S 23 of the Constitution. 
59  S 5(2)(f)–(g). 
60  37 of 2002. 
61  52 of 1998. 
62  53 of 1998. 
63  See the discussion of the definition of "service" in 2.6 in the article. An insurance policy would 
therefore be exempted from the application of the Act. 
64  S 5(5). Also see the discussion on the effect of S 5(8) of the Act in 2.6 in the article. Further, see 
Stassen De Rebus 43.  
65  S 5(1)(a)–(d). 
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The first important definition is that of "transaction".66 A "transaction" refers to 
transactions in the ordinary course of business and once-off transactions are 
therefore not transactions in terms of the Act. A transaction is an agreement between 
two or more persons for the supply of goods or services for consideration.67  
 
However, supply for consideration68 is not always a requirement of a "transaction", 
since, in terms of Section 5(6), certain arrangements must be regarded or deemed 
as a "transaction" irrespective of whether a charge or economic contribution is 
required. For example, the free supply of energy drinks by a marathon club to its 
members will constitute a transaction. These arrangements that must be regarded as 
a transaction include the supply of goods or services in the ordinary course of 
business to members of a club, trade union, association, society or an incorporated 
or corporate voluntary association of people for a common purpose.69  
 
A solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement also constitutes a 
"transaction".70 Furthermore, an offer by a potential franchisor to enter into a 
franchise agreement with a potential franchisee, a franchise agreement or an 
agreement supplementary to it, and the supply of goods and services to a franchisee 
in terms of the franchise agreement also constitute a "transaction" between a 
supplier and consumer in terms of the Act.71 The Act applies to these potential 
franchises or franchise agreements, irrespective of the Section 5(2)(b) exclusion that 
states that the Act does not apply to transactions in which the consumer is a juristic 
person whose asset value or annual turnover equals or exceeds a threshold value to 
be determined by the Minister.72 Therefore, the Act applies to the above-mentioned 
franchise transactions irrespective of whether the size of the consumer juristic 
person falls outside the determined threshold. The reason that the Act applies 
irrespective of the annual turnover or asset value of the franchisees could be 
because franchise agreements are usually concluded between a larger franchisor 
                                                 
66  S 1 sv "transaction". 
67  S 1 sv "transaction". 
68  S 1 sv "consideration". 
69  S 5(6)(a). 
70  S 5(6)(b). 
71  S 5(6)(c)–(e). 
72  S 5(7). See 2.7 in the article on the threshold determination. 
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and a smaller juristic person established by an individual or by a few individual 
consumers (as the franchisee).  
 
Furthermore, the Act applies to "transactions" in terms of Section 5, irrespective of 
whether the supplier resides or has its principal office outside South Africa, or 
irrespective of the supplier's nature73 or the fact that a licence is required to supply 
the products or services or part thereof to the public.74 The effect is therefore that the 
Act also applies to foreign franchisors and suppliers of goods and services in terms 
of every transaction occurring within South Africa, even if the supplier or franchisor 
has no principal office or residence within South Africa. This could result in 
enforcement, jurisdictional and choice of law issues. For example, it would be difficult 
to enforce a consumer's remedies in terms of the Act against a franchisor residing 
outside the borders of South Africa. 
 
The second important definition is that of a "consumer".75 A "consumer" is any 
person76 to whom goods or services are marketed or supplied in the ordinary course 
of a supplier's business, unless the transaction is exempted from the application of 
the Act by Sections 5(2) or 5(3).77 Furthermore, a user, a recipient or beneficiary of a 
product or service is a consumer, even if the person was not a party to the 
transaction for the purposes of the supply of the goods or service. This would, for 
example, be in a case in which a person receives a gift from another consumer. The 
receiver of the gift will then also be regarded as a consumer.78 A franchisee in terms 
of a franchise agreement is also a consumer to the extent provided for in Section 
5(6).79 Although a juristic person can be a "consumer" in terms of the Act, the Act will 
not always protect a consumer-juristic person because the Act does not apply to 
                                                 
73  S 5(8)(c). The supplier can be an individual, juristic person, partnership, trust, organ of state, an 
entity directed or owned by an organ of state or a public–private partnership. Although the State 
is not protected as a consumer under the Act (see S 5(2)(a)), it can still be a supplier. 
74  S 5(8)(a)–(d). 
75  S 1 sv "consumer". 
76  In terms of the definition of a "person" in S 1, a juristic person is included. 
77  See the exemptions in 2.5 of the article. 
78  However, it is not clear whether a recipient or beneficiary would have locus standi in terms of 
S 4(1)(a) to ensure realisation of his/her consumer rights. 
79  See the discussion on S 5(6) in 2.8 in the article. 
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transactions in which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or annual 
turnover equals or exceeds a threshold value to be determined by the Minister.80 
 
The third important definition is that of "goods".81 The definition contains the word 
"includes". The effect of the word "includes" is possibly that the definition is not 
limited only to the specific items listed in the definition.82 "Goods" include anything 
marketed for human consumption, any tangible objects, literature, music, 
photographs, motion pictures, games, information, data, software, codes or other 
intangible products written on any medium, licences to use such intangible objects, 
legal interests in land or other immovable property, gas, water and electricity. Bread, 
compact discs, electronic appliances and books, for example, qualify as goods. 
 
The fourth important definition is that of "service".83 "Service" includes, but is not 
limited to, work performed by a person for the direct or indirect benefit of another; the 
provision of education, information, advice or consultation;84 banking or similar 
financial services;85 transportation of goods or an individual; accommodation; 
entertainment or access to entertainment; access to electronic communication 
infrastructure;86 access or a right of access to an event, premises, activity or facility; 
or access to or use of property in terms of a "rental".87 "Service" also includes the 
right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over, land or immovable property, and 
the rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement to the extent provided for 
in Section 5(6). Banks, advice or intermediary services subject to regulation in terms 
of the FAIS Act are excluded from the application of the Act, but the Act will, inter 
alia, apply to marketing of financial services.88 Any service89 that is regulated by the 
Short-term Insurance Act or the Long-term Insurance Act is excluded from service 
for the purposes of the Act.90 The exclusion of services regulated by the Insurance 
                                                 
80  S 5(2)(b). See 2.7 in the article on the threshold determination. 
81  S 1 sv "goods". 
82  The definition of "service", however, unlike that of "goods", expressly contains the words 
"includes, but is not limited thereto". See S 2(7) on the interpretation of "includes". 
83  S 1 sv "service". 
84  This could include medical advice. 
85  See 2.5 in the article on the application of the Act and the exclusion of some services. 
86  Such as access to cellular network coverage. 
87  S 1 sv "rental". 
88  Again, see 2.5 in the article on the application of the Act and the exclusion of some services. 
89  S 1 sv "service". 
90  See the discussion on the application of these Acts in 2.5 in the article.  
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Acts is subject to the condition that they should be aligned with the consumer 
protection measures provided for in the Consumer Protection Act within eighteen 
months from the commencement of the Act.91 Should the legislature fail to align 
these Acts with the measures in the Consumer Protection Act within the prescribed 
time, the Consumer Protection Act will apply to these services.92 
 
In order to determine the field of application of the Act, it is further necessary to 
analyse the definition of "supplier".93 A "supplier" is any person94 who markets goods 
or services. To market means to "supply" or "promote"95 goods or services.96 In 
terms of Section 1, "promote" means to advertise, display or offer to supply services 
or goods in the ordinary course of business for consideration. It also means to make 
any representation in the ordinary course of business that could be inferred as 
expressing willingness to supply services or goods for consideration or engagement 
in any other conduct in the ordinary course of business that could reasonably be 
construed to be an inducement or attempted inducement to a person to engage in a 
transaction. "Supply"97 in relation to goods includes98 to sell, rent, exchange and hire 
in the ordinary course of business for consideration,99 and in relation to services, it 
means to sell services, to perform or to cause services to be performed or provided, 
and to grant access to premises, events, activities or facilities in the ordinary course 
of business for consideration. The words "to grant access to" possibly also refer to 
so-called agents or third parties selling, for example, tickets for entertainment shows 
and tours. These definitions of "supply" and "supplier" are wide, and the Act will 
therefore affect a very wide range of suppliers of goods and services. 
                                                 
91  In other words, the insurance industry must align insurance legislation with the consumer 
protection measures in the Act before 24 April 2012, failing which the Act will apply. 
92  Item 10 of Schedule 2. 
93  S 1 sv "supplier". Whether an innocent consumer would still be protected in terms of the Act 
should the supplier's acts be unlawful or illegal (other than in terms of the Act) is not clear from 
the definition of "supplier". However, in terms of S 44(1)(a)–(b), a consumer has a right to 
assume that a supplier is entitled to sell or lease goods. Furthermore, in terms of S 44(2), if a 
transaction between a consumer and a supplier infringes a right or claim of a third party 
pertaining to these goods, the supplier is liable to the third party. See 3.6.5 in the article on a 
consumer's right to assume that a supplier is entitled to sell and lease goods. 
94  S 1 sv "juristic person". 
95  Also see Stassen De Rebus 42–43. 
96  S 1 sv "market". 
97  S 1 sv "supply". 
98  In cases in which goods are supplied, the definition of "supply" is not limited to the instances 
listed in the definition, due to the use of the word "includes". To the contrary, the definition of 
"supply" in relation to services is limited. 
99  S 1 sv "consideration". 
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2.7 Threshold determination100 
 
Save for the transactions relating to franchise agreements as contemplated in 
Section 5(6)(b)–(e),101 the Act does not apply to transactions in which the consumer 
is a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover equals or exceeds the 
monetary threshold value determined the Minister.102 The Minister, by notice in the 
Government Gazette, must determine the threshold by the "early effective date"103 
(namely 24 April 2010).104 This so-called "initial threshold" takes effect on the 
"general effective date"105 (namely 24 October 2010).106 The Minister must 
determine subsequent monetary thresholds at intervals of a maximum five years.107 
Each subsequent interval will take effect six months after the date on which it is 
published in the Government Gazette.108 
 
2.8 Franchise requirements109 
 
The Act specifically regulates franchise agreements110 (which are excluded from the 
definition of "consumer agreements").111 It provides that a franchise agreement must 
comply with the following requirements:112  
 
(a) it must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the franchisee;113 
                                                 
100  S 6. 
101  Ss 5(2) and 5(7).  
102  See the discussion on the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
103  S 6(1). 
104  Item 1(1) of Schedule 2 sv "early effective date"; and also see item 2(1) of Schedule 2. The "early 
effective date" refers to the date that is one year after the date on which the Act was signed by 
the President. 
105  S 6(2). 
106  Item 1(1) of Schedule 2 sv "general effective date"; and also see item 2(2) of Schedule 2. The 
"general effective date" refers to the date that is eighteen months after the date on which the Act 
was signed by the President. 
107  S 6(1). 
108  S 6(2). 
109  S 7. 
110  A "transaction" under the Act includes a franchise agreement. See S 1 sv "franchise agreement"; 
and the discussion of the application of the Act and the definitions in the Act in 2.5–2.6 in the 
article.  
111  S 1 sv "consumer agreement". 
112  S 7(1). 
113  S 7(1)(a). 
W JACOBS, PN STOOP & R VAN NIEKERK                      PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
317/508 
 
(b) it must include any prescribed information or address any categories of 
information as prescribed; and 114–115  
(c) it must comply with the requirements of Section 22 on plain and 
understandable language.116 
 
One of the controversial rights of a franchisee in terms of the Act is that it may cancel 
a franchise agreement (for any reason) without incurring any cost or penalty within 
ten business days after signature of the agreement by giving written notice to the 
franchisor.117 Such cancellation may have far-reaching implications for the franchise 
industry in South Africa.118  
 
Agreements often include a clause that each party will be responsible for its own 
legal costs and disbursements incurred in the negotiation, preparation and signature 
of the agreement. In the event of cancellation by the franchisee in terms of Section 
7(2), the franchisor would, for example, not be able to hold the franchisee 
accountable for its (the franchisor's) own legal costs incurred in negotiating, 
preparing or signing the agreement, nor for any penalties or spilled costs due to the 
cancellation of the contract. Would a franchisee be liable to pay its own legal fees if it 
cancels the agreement in terms of Section 7(2), or would the franchisor be liable for 
those costs as well? Should the franchisee have appointed, and given instructions 
to, its own legal advisor, it is the authors' opinion that the franchisee should carry any 
legal costs so incurred.  
 
Franchisors are well advised to wait ten business days after the signature of the 
franchise agreement before executing the franchise agreement (and thereby 
incurring further costs), as no costs or penalties would be recoverable from the 
franchisee in the event of cancellation in terms of Section 7(2). Section 7(2) of the 
                                                 
114  S 7(1)(b). 
115  S 7(3). The Minister may prescribe information to be set out in franchise agreements generally, 
within specific categories or industries. 
116  S 7(1)(c). Also see S 22; and the discussion of S 22 in 3.4.1 in the article. 
117  See S 7(2). 
118  See Du Preez 2009 TSAR 77 for a concise summary of the important concerns raised against 
the CPA Bill in regard to franchises. The same objections may be raised by the franchise industry 
against the provisions of the Act dealing with franchises.  
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Act therefore provides the franchisee with a cooling-off right of ten days after 
signature of the franchise agreement. 
 
3 Fundamental consumer rights: A critical overview and analysis 
 
It is peculiar that the first eight of the umbrella fundamental consumer rights are 
worded in the positive (namely the right to: equality in the consumer market;119 
privacy;120 choice;121 disclosure and information;122 fair and responsible marketing;123 
fair and honest dealing;124 fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions;125 and fair 
value, good quality and safety),126 but that the ninth is worded in the negative127 
(namely the supplier's accountability to consumers).128 
 
3.1 The right of equality in the consumer market129 
 
3.1.1 Protection against discriminatory marketing 
 
Protection against discriminatory marketing is the first consumer right that is 
provided for under the right of equality in the consumer market. Section 8 of the Act 
is important in South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, in which the state is 
committed to the goal of achieving equality.130 However: "[t]he idea of equality is a 
difficult and deeply controversial social ideal. At its most basic and abstract the 
formal idea of equality is that people who are similarly situated in relevant ways 
should be treated similarly".131  
                                                 
119  S 8–10. 
120  S 11–12. 
121  S 13–21. 
122  S 22–28. 
123  S 29–39. 
124  S 40–47. 
125  S 48–52. 
126  S 53–61. 
127  Some legal experts distinguish between the eight fundamental consumer rights on the one hand 
and the sections dealing with supplier's accountability to consumers on the other hand. See 
Dinnie Financial Mail 112 where he commented on one of the consumer protection bills. 
128  S 62–67. 
129  See Chp 2 Part A paras 8–10. 
130  S 1(a) of the Constitution. S 8 of the Act is also in accordance with the Promotion of Equality and 
the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
131  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 230. Also see S 9 of the Constitution on the right to 
equality. 
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Section 8 of the Act confirms the right to equality by prohibiting the supplier of goods 
and services to discriminate unfairly against a person or category of persons in 
relation to access, priority, supply and pricing, and even in relation to the 
enforcement of judgment or termination of an agreement. 
 
3.1.2 Reasonable grounds for differential treatment in specific circumstances 
 
Section 9 of the Act provides for reasonable grounds for differentiation in specific 
circumstances. A supplier may, for example, refuse to provide access or to supply 
certain goods, such as tobacco or liquor, to a minor in accordance with public 
regulations or on the grounds of taking reasonable precautions to protect the health 
of a minor.132 
 
It is further not a contravention of the consumer right of equality to market any goods 
or services in a way that gives preference to a particular group of consumers if those 
goods or services are reasonably intended to satisfy a specific need of that group of 
consumers.133 The marketing of a combination of vitamins for older persons may, for 
instance, be targeted at an older segment of the population and would therefore not 
amount to discriminatory marketing.134 
 
3.1.3 Jurisdiction of the equality court  
 
Section 9 of the Act does not limit the authority of a court to assess the 
reasonableness of any conduct135 or to determine the fairness thereof in a 
transaction.136 In an alleged breach of the equality provisions, a party may institute 
proceedings before an equality court137 or file a complaint with the Commission and, 
should the complaint appear to be valid, the Commission must refer it to the equality 
                                                 
132  S 9(1)(a)(i)–(ii). 
133  Also see S 9(3) of the Constitution.  
134  S 9(3). 
135  S 9(4)(a). 
136  S 9(4)(b). 
137  S 10(1)(a). 
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court.138 There is a presumption that any differentiation prohibited by Section 8 of the 
Act is unfair discrimination unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.139 
 
3.2 The consumer's right to privacy140 
 
The right to privacy in terms of the Act eventuates from Section 14 in the 
Constitution. According to Kirby,141 "[t]he Act presents the most comprehensive set 
of consumer rights relating to privacy. Careful consideration must be given to the 
nature of the interaction between suppliers and consumers to ensure a wide field of 
application".  
 
The Act entrenches the consumer's right to refuse or accept the advances of direct 
marketing.142 "Direct marketing" means to approach a person, either in person or by 
mail or electronic communication, for the direct or indirect purpose of promoting or 
offering to supply, goods or services to that person in the ordinary course of 
business. Direct marketing also includes a request for donation of any kind.143  
 
Consumers now have a right to restrict unwanted direct marketing.144 A cooling-off 
period for contracts concluded as a result of direct marketing has also been 
introduced.145 Consumers may now terminate transactions resulting from direct 
marketing without reason or penalty. 146 The consumer may cancel an agreement 
within five business days after the date on which he/she concluded the agreement or 
on which he/she received the goods, whichever date is the latest. The agreement 
may be cancelled by written notice of cancellation to the supplier or in any other 
recorded form, such as by way of an e-mail. In terms of Section 16(1), this cooling-
                                                 
138  S 10(1)(b). 
139  S 10(2)(a). 
140  Chp 2 Part B para 11. 
141  Kirby 2009 Without Prejudice 28. 
142  S 11(1)(a). 
143  S 1 sv "direct marketing". 
144  S 11(1). 
145  S 16(3). Also see 3.5.4 in the article, in which this cooling-off right is discussed and further see 
3.3.6 in the article on the consumer's right to return goods. 
146  S 16(3)(a)–(b). Also see 3.5.4 in the article on direct marketing and the cooling-off right. 
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off period does not apply to a transaction to which Section 44 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act147 applies. 
 
The right to privacy includes the right to refuse to accept any communication for the 
purpose of direct marketing and includes the right to require another person to 
discontinue unwanted direct marketing.148 A consumer may also, in advance, block 
any communication primarily for the purposes of direct marketing, other than 
communication in person.149 A consumer, for example, has a right to block the 
receipt of flyers or brochures in his/her letterbox or unsolicited phone calls pre-
emptively. The Commission may establish a registry in which a consumer may 
register such a pre-emptive block.150 
 
Direct marketers have to consult the registry, and should the consumer's name 
appear in the register, they may not address any direct marketing to that consumer, 
within the range of the block.151 No person may charge a consumer a fee for 
demanding a supplier refrain from initiating any further direct marketing or for 
registering a pre-emptive block.152 This places a heavy burden on suppliers who 
make use of direct marketing. It entails extra costs to prevent the infringement of a 
consumer's right to privacy where he/she has registered pre-emptive blocks or has 
demanded not to receive further direct marketing.  
 
The Act also provides for a prohibited period during which direct marketers may not 
contact a consumer at home for promotions, unless the consumer has requested or 
agreed to the contrary. The Minister may prescribe these periods by notice in the 
Government Gazette.153 Section 12 relates to direct marketing to a consumer at 
home. "At home" is not defined in the Act, and the question arises whether it will 
apply to direct marketing over a cell phone. Should direct marketing be conducted by 
a cell phone, it will be difficult to prove that the consumer is indeed at home or 
                                                 
147  25 of 2002 (hereafter the ECTA). 
148  S 11(1)(a)–(b). 
149  S 11(1)(c). 
150  S 11(3). 
151  S 11(4). 
152  Ss 11(2) and 11(5). 
153  S 12(1)–(2). 
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elsewhere. However, this provision should be interpreted to the benefit of the 
consumer, keeping in mind the purpose of the Act.154  
 
3.3 The consumer's right to choose155 
 
3.3.1 Consumer's right to select suppliers 
 
In terms of Section 13(1), a supplier may not group or bundle goods by requiring, as 
a condition of entering into an agreement, that the consumer must buy other goods 
or services from that supplier,156 or enter into an additional agreement or transaction 
with the same supplier or designated third party,157 or agree to purchase any specific 
goods from a third party.158 Bundling, for example, refers to a case in which a pair of 
shoes is offered for sale together with a pair of socks and in which the supplier 
requires the consumer to buy them in combination. Bundling is not entirely prohibited 
by the Act, but is merely regulated. 
 
For bundling to be allowed, the supplier must prove that:159 
 
(a) the convenience of the bundling outweighs the limitation on the freedom of 
choice;160 or 
(b) the bundling is to the economic benefit of the consumer;161 or 
(c) the supplier also offers these bundled goods separately and at individual 
prices.162 
 
3.3.2 Expiry and renewal of fixed-term agreements 
 
Section 14 regulates the expiry and renewal of fixed-term agreements, but it is not 
applicable to transactions between juristic persons, regardless of their annual 
                                                 
154  See 2.2 in the article. 
155  Chp 2 Part C par 13. 
156  S 13(1)(a). 
157  S 13(1)(b). 
158  S 13(1)(c). 
159  S 13(1)(i)–(iii). These provisos in S 13(1)(i)–(iii) are in the alternative. 
160  S 13(1)(i). 
161  S 13(1)(ii). 
162  S 13(1)(iii). 
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turnover or asset value.163 Fixed-term agreements may not exceed the maximum 
period prescribed by the Minister for the different categories of consumer 
agreements.164 Section 14 has an enormous impact on a large number of entities 
that use fixed-term agreements, such as gym membership or cell phone contracts. 
These contracts have to be redrafted to align them with this section.  
 
In terms of this section, a consumer may cancel a fixed-term agreement on the 
expiry of its fixed term without penalty or charge.165 However, the consumer will still 
be liable for any amount owed in terms of the agreement up to the date of 
cancellation.166 Alternatively, a consumer may cancel a fixed-term agreement before 
the expiry date of its fixed term by giving twenty business days' notice. This notice 
must be given in writing or in any other recorded manner.167 Again, the consumer will 
be liable for any amount owed in terms of the agreement up to the date of 
cancellation and in addition the supplier may impose a reasonable cancellation 
penalty.168 Cancellation clauses in fixed-term agreements that require a longer 
cancellation period than 20 days will no longer be enforceable. This provision is 
therefore to the benefit of the consumer. However, the supplier is also protected by 
the Act as it may cancel a fixed-term agreement by twenty business days' written 
notice in the event of material failure by the consumer, unless the consumer has 
remedied his/her failure.169  
 
A supplier must notify the consumer not more than eighty days or less than forty 
days before the expiry date, of the impending expiry date of a fixed-term agreement. 
The notice must be in writing or in any other recordable form.170 The Act makes 
provision for the automatic renewal of a fixed-term agreement. After a fixed-term 
contract has expired, the agreement will automatically continue on a monthly 
                                                 
163  S 14(1). 
164  S 14(2)(a). See S 14(4) on the Minister's notice in the Government Gazette.  
165  S 14(2)(b)(i)(aa). 
166  S 14(3)(a). 
167  S 14(2)(b)(i)(bb). It is uncertain whether recorded notice includes recorded telephone 
conversations. 
168  S 14(3)(a)–(b). The supplier must credit the consumer with any amount that remains the property 
of the consumer as of the date of cancellation. Also see S 14(4)(c) on the reasonableness of 
credits and charges as to be prescribed by the Minister. 
169  S 14(2)(b)(ii). 
170  S 14(2)(c). 
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basis,171 unless the consumer expressly terminated the agreement on the expiry 
date or agreed to the renewal of the agreement for a further fixed term.172 
 
3.3.3 Pre-authorisation of repair or maintenance services 
 
A further protective mechanism introduced by Section 15 deals with the pre-
authorisation of repair or maintenance services. This is to counteract the practice 
that existed of repair or maintenance work being done without the prior approval of 
an estimate by a consumer. The supplier then sometimes kept the goods in his, her 
or its possession until the repairs or services were fully paid for. 
 
Section 15 applies to transactions or agreements with a price value above the 
threshold prescribed by the Minister.173 It is applicable to maintenance and repair 
services in a case in which the provider takes possession of the property or in which 
the consumer has asked for a quote before the services are to be performed or 
goods are to be supplied.174 
 
A service provider may not charge a consumer for the supply of goods of services 
unless a quote that satisfies the prescribed requirements has been provided and the 
consumer has authorised the work.175 The supplier may further charge a consumer 
for the goods or services should an offer of an estimate have been declined (note 
that this implies that the supplier must have offered an estimate to a consumer) and 
the consumer authorised the work or should the consumer have pre-authorised the 
charges up to a specific amount.176 The fee charged may not exceed the maximum 
pre-authorised amount or estimate, unless the consumer consented thereto. A 
service provider may not charge a consumer for preparing an estimate, unless it 
disclosed the price for preparing that estimate beforehand and the consumer 
approved it.177 
 
                                                 
171  S 14(2)(d). 
172  S 14(2)(d)(i)–(ii). 
173  S 15(1)(a). 
174  S 15(1)(b)(i)–(ii). 
175  S 15(2)(a). 
176  S 15(2)(b)(i)–(ii) and S 14(4)(a)–(b). 
177  S 15(3). Also see S 15(3)(a)–(b). 
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3.3.4 Consumer's right to cancel advance reservation, booking or order 
 
Section 17 regulates the right to cancel advance reservations, bookings or orders. It 
does not apply to a franchise agreement or special-order goods.178 Therefore, if a 
consumer orders custom-made goods, the consumer will not be able to cancel the 
order in terms of Section 17. 
 
In terms of the Act, the consumer will not necessarily forfeit the full amount or 
deposit paid for an advance booking, but the supplier may impose a reasonable 
cancellation fee. Cancellation charges may not exceed a fair amount in the 
circumstances.179 Section 17(4)(a)–(d) lists the factors to be taken into account in 
determining whether a cancellation charge is reasonable. It may be inferred that 
suppliers are prohibited from advertising or selling a product at a lower price, with the 
provision that no refund will be given upon cancellation. This section may also 
impact on advocates, attorneys and doctors. It will, for example, influence an 
advocate's full day fees if a matter is settled before or during the trial.  
 
Consumers enjoy further protection in so far as no cancellation fee may be charged 
in a case in which a consumer is unable to honour the agreement on account of 
hospitalisation or death of the person for whom or for whose benefit the booking was 
made.180  
 
3.3.5 Consumer's right in respect of delivery of goods or supply of services 
 
Section 19 provides for the rights that a consumer enjoys in respect of the delivery of 
goods or supplying of services. Section 19 does not apply to goods or services 
ensuing from a franchise agreement, or in a case in which the performance of that 
transaction is governed by Section 46 of the ECTA.181  
 
                                                 
178  "Special-order goods" are defined in S 1 as "goods that a supplier expressly or implicitly was 
required or expected to procure, create or alter specifically to satisfy the consumer's 
requirement". 
179  S 17(3)(b). 
180  S 17(5). 
181  S 19(1)(a)–(b). 
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The place and time of the delivery and the risk involved in respect thereof are 
regulated by this section. Unless agreed to the contrary, it is an implied condition of 
an agreement that the supplier must deliver the goods on the agreed date and time, 
or otherwise, within a reasonable time at the agreed place of delivery and at the cost 
of the supplier.182 In the alternative, the agreed place of delivery is the supplier's 
place of business and by the lack of such an address, the supplier's residence.183 
The Act expressly states that "... it is an implied condition ... that the supplier is 
responsible to deliver ... on the agreed date ... time ... place".184 It is uncertain why 
the Act refers to implied terms because such terms do not relate to terms expressly 
agreed upon. 
 
In terms of Section 19(2)(c), risk will only pass to the consumer upon acceptance of 
delivery by the latter, unless the parties agreed to the contrary. Since risk will 
generally pass to the consumer upon delivery, it is of utmost importance for a 
supplier to obtain proof of the time and place of delivery, for example, an 
acknowledgement of receipt will be sufficient proof. The consumer is regarded to 
have accepted delivery of the goods in the circumstances as set out in Section 19(4) 
and must allow the consumer a reasonably opportunity to examine the goods.185  
 
Should a supplier contravene Section 19 of the Act, a consumer has different 
remedies, depending on the circumstances of the case:186 
 
(a) should the supplier have tendered delivery at a location, date or time 
other than as agreed, the consumer may either accept such delivery, 
require delivery at the agreed location, date and time should that time 
have not yet passed, or cancel the agreement without penalty and treat 
any goods or services as unsolicited in accordance with Section 21; or 
(b) should the supplier have delivered a larger quantity of goods than the 
consumer has agreed to buy, the consumer may either reject the whole 
delivery, or accept delivery of the goods and pay for the agreed 
                                                 
182  S 19(2)(a)(i)–(iii). 
183  S 19(2)(b). 
184  Emphasis added. 
185  Ss 19(4)(a)–(b)(ii) and 19(5). 
186  S 19(6)–(8). Also see 3.3.7 in the article. 
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quantity at the agreed rate, but treat the excess as unsolicited goods in 
accordance with Section 21; or 
(c) if goods that the consumer has agreed to buy are on delivery mixed 
with goods of a different description than contemplated in the 
agreement, the consumer may either reject all of the delivered goods, 
or accept the delivery of the goods that are in accordance with the 
agreement and reject the rest.  
 
Owing to the extensive consequences of incorrect delivery under the Act, suppliers 
are well advised to monitor delivery of goods in future diligently. 
 
3.3.6 Consumer's right to return goods 
 
Section 20 does not substitute the right that every consumer has in respect of the 
return of unsafe or defective goods, nor does it substitute any other right that exists 
between a supplier and consumer to return goods for a refund.187 It makes provision 
for an additional right, to the benefit of the consumer, to return goods within ten 
business days.188 This includes goods in terms of an agreement arising out of direct 
marketing, in a case in which the consumer rescinded the agreement during the 
cooling-off period (which may be returned at the consumer's risk and expense) and 
goods that the consumer did not have the opportunity to examine before delivery and 
then rejected delivery; a mixture of goods in a case in which the consumer refused 
delivery, as well as a case in which goods intended to satisfy a particular purpose 
were then found to be unsuitable for that particular purpose (the latter three 
categories of goods may be returned at the supplier's risk and expense).189 However, 
certain goods may not be returned under this section. Under Section 20(3), certain 
goods may not be returned in a case in which, inter alia, public health or a public 
regulation prohibits the return of goods to a supplier once they have been supplied, 
for example, medicine that has been dispensed to a customer by a pharmacy. 
 
                                                 
187  S 20(1)(a)–(b). Also see 3.8.4 in the article in respect of unsafe or defective goods. 
188  S 20(4). 
189  S 20(2)(a)–(d). Also read Ss 16, 19(5), 19(8) and 55(3) in conjunction with S 20(2). 
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Upon return of the goods, the supplier must refund the consumer the price paid for 
the goods, less any amount that he, she or it may charge. Should the goods not 
have been opened and should they still be in their original packaging, the consumer 
may not be charged an amount in respect of the goods.190 In a case in which the 
original goods were opened but repacked in their original packaging, the supplier 
may charge a reasonable amount. The amount charged will be for the actual use of 
the goods or any consumption or depletion of the goods.191 In addition, the supplier 
may charge a reasonable amount for restoration costs to make the goods fit for re-
stocking,192 unless it was necessary for the consumer to open the packaging to 
determine whether the goods conformed to the description, or whether they were fit 
for their intended purpose.193  
 
3.3.7 Unsolicited goods or services 
 
A consumer has no obligation to pay for unsolicited goods or service and may retain 
such goods lawfully. Section 21(1)(a)–(e) lists the circumstances under which goods 
or services will be regarded as unsolicited, subject to the conditions in Section 
21(2).194 There is some uncertainty regarding these provisions. 
 
In the event of delivery of unsolicited goods or services, the supplier has ten 
business days to notify the consumer of any incorrect delivery. These goods will only 
become unsolicited should the supplier then fail to recover the goods within twenty 
business days after he, she or it has informed the consumer of the incorrect 
delivery.195  
 
In a case in which it is clear that goods were delivered incorrectly (for example, in a 
case in which the goods were addressed to another person) or in which it is clear to 
the ordinary consumer under the circumstances that goods were incorrectly 
delivered, those goods will again not be classified as unsolicited goods 
                                                 
190  Ss 20(5) and 20(6)(a). 
191  S 20(6)(b)(i)–(ii). 
192  S 20(6)(c)(ii). 
193  S (20)(6)(c)(ii)(aa)–(bb). 
194  Also see 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 in the article. 
195  S 21(2)(a). 
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immediately.196 The goods will only become unsolicited goods after the consumer 
has informed the supplier of the apparent misdelivery and the supplier has not 
recovered the goods within twenty business days after being so informed.197 The Act 
does not make provision for the manner in which the consumer should notify the 
supplier. Should the notification not be in writing, the consumer should keep a record 
of the manner in which he/she notified the supplier as proof thereof. This section 
does not place a duty on a consumer to inform the supplier of an apparent 
misdelivery, but makes provision for the instance in which a consumer does inform 
the supplier of the misdelivery.  
 
The question arises whether the goods will become unsolicited should the consumer 
not inform the supplier of the misdelivery. A further question arises as to the date at 
which goods that were delivered purposely to the consumer without being requested 
will become unsolicited, for example, books sent by book clubs without the 
consumer's request or prior knowledge (such as goods referred to in terms of 
Section 21(1)(e)). The prerequisites in Section 20(2) cater for instances in which 
goods were misdelivered or delivered in error, whereas goods that were delivered 
purposely to the consumer without being requested are not provided for. 
 
In a case in which a consumer has paid for unsolicited goods or services, the 
consumer is entitled to be refunded by the supplier, and the refund must include 
interest from the date that the amount was paid to the supplier.198 
 
3.4 The right to disclosure and information199 
 
3.4.1 The right to information in plain and understandable language 
 
A specific right embedded under the umbrella right of information and disclosure is 
the right to information in plain and understandable language. Agreements should be 
drafted in a way that enables consumers to make informed choices and to 
understand the terms of the agreement into which they are entering. 
                                                 
196  S 21(2)(b)(i)–(ii). 
197  S 21(2)(b)(i)–(ii). 
198  S 21(9). 
199  Chp 2 Part D paras 22–28. 
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The legislature considers the principle of plain language in a serious light, as it is 
also required by the National Credit Act.200 Unlike the National Credit Act, the 
Consumer Protection Act does not require that information should be provided in one 
of the official languages. An official language requirement would have placed an 
enormous burden on the supplier. The requirement of plain and understandable 
language may provide sufficient protection to the consumer.201  
 
It is uncertain what the position will be in respect of foreigners in South Africa with 
permanent residence status, should they only speak a foreign language. How would 
the requirements of plain and understandable language be complied with? This 
matter might be addressed in the regulations to the Act. 
 
Any notice, document or visual representation that is required in terms of the Act or 
any other law should be in the form prescribed in the Act. If no form is prescribed, it 
must be in plain language.202 Plain language is language that enables an ordinary 
consumer (for whom a notice, document or representation is intended), with average 
literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer, to understand the contents 
without undue effort.203  
 
Section 22 applies to all consumers. Whether dealing with consumers who are more 
educated or consumers with no education, the document or representation must be 
in plain language. However, to determine whether a document is in plain language, 
the class of persons for whom a document is intended is considered. 
 
In order to further determine whether a document or representation is in plain and 
understandable language, the following factors may be taken into account: 
 
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the document or 
representation;204 
                                                 
200  S 64. 
201  See Du Preez 2009 TSAR 76. 
202  S 22(1)(a)–(b). 
203  S 22(2). 
204  S 22(2)(a). 
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(b) the manner in which the representation is done or the style of the 
document;205 
(c) the manner in which the sentences are structured and the types of words 
used in the document; and206 
(d) the aids used to assist the consumer in the reading and understanding of the 
document or representation.207 
 
Section 22 will compel many suppliers to redraft their contracts to meet the plain 
language requirements. These requirements are in line with international practice.208 
The Act provides for the Commission to publish guidelines for methods of assessing 
plain language.209 Therefore, consumers can look forward to more user-friendly 
agreements and representations. 
 
3.4.2 Disclosure of price of goods or services 
 
Section 23 regulates matters regarding the price of goods or services, and does not 
apply should Section 43 of the ECTA apply to the transaction.210 Retailers are 
prohibited from displaying any goods for sale without showing the price of these 
goods.211 Section 23(5) lists the manner in which to display a price adequately. 
Should goods be displayed for the main purpose of advertising or should they be in 
an area to which the public does not normally have access, the supplier will not be 
required to display the price,212 for example, in the display window of a shop or in the 
dispensary of a pharmacy. 
 
Subject to certain exceptions, a supplier may not demand that a consumer should 
pay a higher price than the displayed price. Should more than one price be 
displayed, the lowest price applies.213 This provision will not apply should the price 
                                                 
205  S 22(2)(b). 
206  S 22(2)(c). 
207  S 22(2)(d). 
208  See Moosajee Financial Mail 113. 
209  S 22(3). 
210  S 23(1)(b). 
211  S 23(3). 
212  S 23(4). 
213  S 23(6)(a)–(b). This section is subject to Ss 23(7)–23(10).  
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have been determined by public regulation,214 should the first price have been fully 
concealed by a second price,215 should the supplier have corrected an obvious error 
and taken reasonable steps to inform consumers,216 and, lastly, should an 
unauthorised person have removed or altered the price.217 It is uncertain whether the 
instance in which a consumer (ie an unauthorised person) moves bar-coded goods 
to another shelf where a lower price has been displayed falls under any of these 
exemptions. It appears that Section 23(6) will apply to such an instance.  
 
The shelf price of goods advertised at a discount is deemed to include the discount, 
unless the discounted price and original prices are recorded next to the goods.218  
 
3.4.3 Product labelling and trade description 
 
Section 24 protects the consumer against any misleading trade descriptions or trade 
descriptions that have been tampered with. No person may apply a trade description 
knowing that it is likely to mislead the consumer, or tamper with a trade description in 
a manner that might mislead a consumer.219 A "trade description" is defined in the 
Act.220  Goods, such as medicines already have labels. They would have to be 
scrutinised for any potential misleading information, such as "Lose ten kg in four 
weeks" and "Anti-ageing effects guaranteed".  
 
The Minister may prescribe categories of goods that must have a trade description 
applied to them,221 or rules to be used in accordance with any international 
agreement for the purpose of determining the country of origin of the goods.222 A 
producer, importer, packager or supplier must disclose genetically modified 
ingredients or components.223 This duty has a wide field of application because it 
                                                 
214  S 23(7). S 23(6), eg, does not apply to the price of petrol, which is determined by public 
regulation. 
215  S 23(8). 
216  S 23(9). 
217  S 23(10). 
218  S 23(11). 
219  S 24(2)(a)–(b). 
220  S 1 sv "trade description". Trade description excludes trademarks, but, eg, include a statement 
as to the ingredients of which any goods consist. 
221  S 24(4)(a). 
222  S 24(4)(b). 
223  S 24(6). 
W JACOBS, PN STOOP & R VAN NIEKERK                      PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
333/508 
 
also applies to a packager, who might not be aware of such ingredients or 
components. 
 
3.4.4 Disclosure or reconditioned and grey-market goods 
 
In terms of Section 25, a person offering or supplying goods, bearing the trademark 
of the original producer or supplier, and that have been re-built, re-conditioned or re-
made, must apply a notice to those goods stating that they have been so altered. A 
person who markets grey-market goods (namely goods imported without the 
approval or licence of the registered trademark owner) must apply a conspicuous 
notice to those goods in the prescribed manner and form.  
 
3.4.5 Sales records  
 
Section 26 provides that a written record of each transaction must be given to the 
consumer.224 The Act further provides for the type of information that should be 
included in the written record, for example, the supplier's full name or registered 
business name and VAT registration number.225 Section 26 does not apply should 
Section 43 of the ECTA apply to the transaction.226 The Minister may also exempt 
suppliers of certain goods or services from this obligation by a notice in the 
Government Gazette.227 
 
3.4.6 Identification of deliverers and installers 
 
In terms of Section 28, should a person be engaged in direct marketing at the 
premises of a consumer while performing services, delivering or installing goods, 
that person must visibly wear an identification device such as a badge to provide 
suitable identification when the consumer requests so.  
                                                 
224  S 26(2). 
225  See S 26(3)(a)–(i) for other information that should be in the written record. 
226  S 26(1)(a). 
227  S 26(4). 
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3.5 The right to fair and responsible marketing228 
 
The aim of this right is, inter alia, to create fair business practices in respect of 
advertising and selling. One of the most important business practices is to be truthful 
in advertising and selling. Creating fair business practices in this regard will ensure 
that real competition between suppliers is made possible, which in turn leads to 
lower prices and better products. It will also lead to greater trust by consumers and 
better relationships between consumers and suppliers in the supply of goods and 
services.229 
 
As stated supra, the Act excludes credit agreements in terms of the National Credit 
Act from its ambit,230 but does not expressly exclude credit marketing. Therefore, the 
National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act should apply to credit 
advertisements and marketing of credit. This leads to a duplication of a regulatory 
scheme and one could accept that the National Credit Regulator could apply for the 
credit industry to be exempted from the marketing provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act in terms of Section 5(3).  
 
However, it is reiterated that should there be any inconsistency between any 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and any other act, the provisions of both 
acts apply concurrently to the extent that it is possible. If it is not possible to apply 
the provisions of the Act concurrently, the provision that extends the greater 
protection to consumers must prevail.231 
 
3.5.1 General standards for marketing of goods or services 
 
In general, a producer's, importer's, distributor's, retailer's or service provider's 
marketing of any goods or service may not be misleading, fraudulent or deceptive.232 
                                                 
228  Chp 2 Part E paras 29–39. 
229  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 para 25. 
230  S 5(2)(d). 
231  S 29. 
232  S 29(b). 
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The marketing of services or goods must not be misleading, fraudulent or deceptive 
in any way, including in respect of the following: 
 
(a) the nature, properties, advantages or uses of the services or goods; 
(b) the conditions or manner in which the services or goods may be supplied; 
(c) the price of goods,233 the existence of a relationship of the price to a 
previous price or a competitor's price for the same or comparable goods or 
services;234  
(d) the sponsoring of an event; or  
(e) any other material aspect of the services or goods.235  
 
A producer, importer, distributor, retailer or service provider may also not market any 
goods or service in a manner that is reasonably likely to imply a misleading or false 
representation concerning the goods or service as contemplated in Section 41.236 
Section 41 prohibits false, misleading or deceptive representations to a consumer, 
either by direct or indirect, expressly or implied representation of material facts to a 
consumer,237 by the use of exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact 
or failure to disclose facts that will amount to deception,238 or by failure to correct a 
misapprehension.239 Praising by a supplier of goods or services, sales talk or so-
                                                 
233  S 29(b)(iii) provides that a supplier "must not market any goods or services in manner that is 
misleading, fraudulent or deceptive … including in respect of (iii) the price at which the goods 
may be supplied, or the existence of, or relationship of the price to, any previous price or 
competitor's price for comparable or similar goods or service". Emphasis added. The word 
"services" is omitted from the part of this provision that refers to price. However, this prohibition 
will prohibit, for example, suppliers or retailers from, amongst others, comparing in a fraudulent, 
deceptive or misleading manner the current price of goods of services with previous prices. 
234  Therefore, for example, the practice of advertising a fifty per cent discount on certain products 
would be prohibited if the discount is not fifty per cent when compared with the previous price of 
that product. 
235  S 29(b)(i)–(v). 
236  S 29(a). 
237  S 41(1)(a). 
238  S 41(1)(b). 
239  S 41(1)(c). Also see S 41(3)(a)–(k) for specific prohibitions of false, misleading or deceptive 
representations or failures to correct misapprehensions on the part of consumers regarding 
goods, services, the status of a supplier, land or other immovable property, maintenance, repair 
facilities, parts, prices, charges, terms of agreements, solicitations and benefits. Also see S 51 
regarding prohibited transactions, agreements, terms or conditions. S 51 applies to court 
proceedings in terms of S 41. The court in terms of S 52 has the power to ensure fair and just 
terms and conditions. See S 53 for the powers of a court. 
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called "puffing" has no binding effect,240 but it could be affected or even prohibited by 
this provision. An example of puffing would be an advertisement stating: "You will 
lose ten kilograms in four weeks. Guaranteed results!". However, a representation 
that goods are new or unused in terms of Section 41(3)(b)(iii) will not be false, 
misleading or deceptive in a case in which the goods have been used only by or on 
behalf of the producer, importer, distributor or retailer for the purposes of reasonable 
testing, service, preparation or for delivery.241 This exclusion covers, for example, the 
situation in which a car retailer imports cars and sells the cars in Gauteng, and then 
has to drive the cars from a harbour to Gauteng in order to deliver the cars. 
Furthermore, the Act regulates specific types of marketing, such as bait, direct or 
catalogue marketing, trade coupons, customer loyalty programmes, alternative work 
schemes and referral selling.242 
 
3.5.2 Bait marketing 
 
Bait marketing is marketing or advertisements aimed at luring or persuading 
consumers to go to a specific place or shop to buy something other than the goods 
or services that were advertised or marketed. The Act prohibits suppliers from 
advertising goods or services as being available at a specific price and manner that 
will mislead or deceive in relation to the actual availability of those goods and 
services.243 Should a supplier have expressly stated in an advertisement that a 
limited amount of goods or services would be available at a specific price, those 
goods or services must be made available to the extent of the expressed limits.244 It 
will not be bait marketing should a supplier have offered to procure another person to 
supply a consumer with the same or similar goods or services of the kind advertised 
within a reasonable time and quantity, and the consumer unreasonably failed to 
accept the offer.245 The bait marketing prohibition therefore ensures availability of 
advertised goods or services, and it prevents consumers from being induced by false 
                                                 
240  See Christie Law of Contract 155, 158, 273–274, in which it is indicated that puffing has no legal 
effect, but that it is difficult to draw the line between mere puffing and misrepresentation. Also 
see Van der Merwe et al Contract 112. 
241  S 40(4).  
242  See 3.5.2–3.5.10 in the article. 
243  S 30(1). 
244  S 30(2). 
245  S 30(3). These exclusions also, with the necessary changes, apply to trade coupons and similar 
promotions and customer loyalty programmes. 
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advertisements to go to a supplier, while the supplier had no intention to sell the 
advertised goods or services but merely to persuade consumers to go to a specific 
shop. This provision does not compel a supplier to state a specified limited quantity, 
time and price in an advertisement, but he, she or it cannot advertise goods or 
services in a manner that may result in consumers being misled in respect to the 
actual availability at the advertised price.246 In effect, the supplier must therefore, 
after advertising goods or services, have a sufficient quantity of those goods or 
services available in order to satisfy the demand. 
 
3.5.3 Negative option marketing 
 
Negative option marketing is the promotion of goods or services to consumers on the 
basis that an agreement automatically comes into existence unless the consumer 
declines an inducement or offer. The Act prohibits negative option marketing, and, 
therefore, agreements entered into as a result of negative option marketing are 
void.247 A typical example of this would be a case in which a supplier sends a book 
via post to a consumer when the consumer did not request this action, and an 
agreement then automatically comes into existence unless the consumer declines 
the offer by returning the book. A modification of an agreement agreed to as result of 
negative option marketing is also void.248 Would that apply, for example, to a 
situation in which a consumer, in terms of an agreement, places a limit on his/her 
monthly cell phone costs and the cell phone provider then automatically increases 
the limit or cap placed on the monthly costs should the consumer does not respond 
to the offer? It appears that this could be a modification of an agreement as a result 
of negative option marketing. 
 
3.5.4 Direct marketing to consumers 
 
Direct marketing is marketing in a case in which a person is approached in person, 
by mail or by electronic communication for the purpose of promoting or offering to 
supply goods or services or requesting a person to make a donation of any kind for 
                                                 
246  S 30(1). 
247  Ss 31(1) and 31(2). 
248  S 31(3).  
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any reason.249 Direct marketing is regulated by the Act. The Act provides that should 
a person (not only a supplier) directly market goods or services and as a result 
conclude an agreement or enter into a transaction, the person then has a duty to, in 
the prescribed form and manner, inform the consumer of his/her cooling-off right in 
terms of the Act.250  
 
The cooling-off right provides that after a transaction or agreement has been 
concluded or after goods subject to a transaction have been delivered as a result of 
direct marketing, a consumer has five business days after the latest date to, by 
written or any recorded notice, rescind the transaction, without reason or penalty.251 
This cooling-off right therefore applies to a "transaction" that resulted from direct 
marketing, but also to donations. The enforcement of the cooling-off right in respect 
of donations can be problematic in practice, especially in a case in which the person 
asking for donations is not known to the consumer. Furthermore, the supplier must 
then, within fifteen business days after receiving notice of the rescission (should no 
goods have been delivered to the consumer) or after receiving the goods from the 
consumer, return payment received to the consumer.252 It is uncertain whether this 
provision caters for instances in which perishable goods have been purchased as a 
result of direct marketing.  
 
Should a direct marketer have left goods with a consumer without requiring or 
arranging payment for it, those goods are unsolicited goods and the consumer then 
has no obligation to pay for those goods.253 The cooling-off period does not apply to 
a transaction should the Section 44 cooling-off right in terms of the ECTA254 apply to 
that transaction.255 
                                                 
249  S 1 sv "direct marketing". 
250  S 32(1). 
251  S 16(3). 
252  S 16(4). In terms of S 16(4)(b), no payment can be collected for a rescinded transaction, except 
as permitted in S 20(6). 
253  Ss 21 and 32(2). 
254  Also see 3.3.7 in the article. 
255  S 16(1). 
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3.5.5 Catalogue marketing 
 
Catalogue marketing refers to an agreement for the supply of goods or services that 
is not entered into in person, and includes agreements concluded telephonically or 
by postal order or fax or in any similar manner in which, with respect to goods, a 
consumer does not have the opportunity to inspect the goods prior to conclusion of 
an agreement.256 Prior to entering into an agreement as a result of catalogue 
marketing, a supplier must disclose certain information to the consumer, having 
regard to the manner in which the supplier and consumer communicate in 
concluding the transaction.257 This information includes the following: 
 
(a) the supplier's name and licence or registration number, if any;  
(b) the supplier's physical business address and contact details;  
(c) the written sales record of each transaction;258  
(d) the currency in which money is payable under the agreement;  
(e) the supplier's delivery arrangements;259  
(f) the cancellation, exchange and refund policies of the supplier, if any;  
(g) the manner and form in which complaints may be lodged; and  
(h) any other information.260  
 
This provision ensures that the consumer is provided with sufficient information 
before he/she enters into an agreement as a result of catalogue marketing. It 
appears that marketing in a case in which a person is approached by post or by 
electronic communication will sometimes constitute direct and catalogue marketing. 
The difference can be that, in the case of catalogue marketing, the consumer never 
had an opportunity to inspect the goods prior to conclusion of an agreement. This 
provision of the Act will not apply to an electronic transaction should Chapter 7 of the 
                                                 
256  S 33(2). 
257  S 33(3). 
258  Required in terms of S 26. 
259  In terms of S 33(3)(e), delivery arrangements include the identity of the shipper, mode of 
transportation and the place of delivery. 
260  S 33(3)(a)–(h). 
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ECTA on consumer protection apply to it,261 and it also does not apply to franchise 
agreements.262 
 
3.5.6 Trade coupons and similar promotions 
 
The Act does not contain a definition of "trade coupons". A "promotional offer" is, 
however, defined as an offer or promise, expressed in any manner, of any prize, 
reward, gift, free goods or services, price reduction, concession or enhancement of 
the quality or quantity of goods and services even should the offer be subject to the 
offeree entering into any other transaction.263 Accordingly, a person must not make a 
promotional offer without the intention of fulfilling it or with the intention of fulfilling it 
in a way other than that offered.264 Furthermore, a document setting out a 
promotional offer must set out the nature of the prize, reward, gift, free goods or 
services, price reduction, concession or enhancement of the quality or quantity of 
goods or discount or free item being offered.265 The document must furthermore, 
inter alia, clearly state to which goods or service the promotional offer relates, and 
the steps required by a consumer to accept the offer or receive the benefits, and the 
person from whom, the time and the place at which the prize, reward and gift may be 
received.266 A sponsor of a promotional offer must also ensure that the supply of the 
thing offered is sufficient to fulfil anticipated demands resulting from the offer, must 
not require consumers to accept inferior quality of goods or services than those 
usually available to other consumers who tender a different form of consideration on 
the same date, and no monetary charge may be imposed for administration, 
processing and handling of transactions in respect of which the consumer tenders a 
trade coupon.267 The same grounds of justification or exclusions that apply to bait 
marketing also apply to trade coupons and promotional offers.268 
 
                                                 
261  S 33(1)(b). 
262  S 33(1)(a). It is uncertain whether franchise agreements are excluded from the application of the 
catalogue marketing provisions. 
263  S 34(2). In terms of S 34, S 34(1) does not apply to a franchise agreement, a loyalty programme 
in terms of S 35 or promotional competitions in terms of S 36. 
264  S 34(3). 
265  S 34(4)(a). 
266  S 34(4)(b)–(d). 
267  S 34(5). 
268  S 34(6). Also see 3.5.2 in the article. 
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3.5.7 Customer loyalty programmes 
 
A "loyalty programme" is any arrangement or scheme in the ordinary course of 
business in terms of which a supplier or an association of suppliers or any person on 
behalf of a supplier or association of suppliers grants or offers loyalty awards or 
credit in connection with an agreement or transaction.269 A "loyalty credit or award" is 
any benefit or rights to goods or services accruing to a consumer; or any benefit 
being granted or points, tokens, devices or any tangible or intangible thing which can 
be accumulated and which entitles the holder to request or assert a claim for goods, 
services or benefits in terms of a loyalty programme.270 Loyalty credits or awards are 
a legal medium of exchange that can be tendered or offered as consideration for any 
goods or services offered in terms of a specific loyalty programme.271 Therefore, a 
person may exchange loyalty credits or awards for services or goods. It is uncertain 
whether the loyalty credits or awards could expire, and whether an agreement may 
make provision for an expiry date.272 A distinction must be drawn between loyalty 
credits, awards or vouchers and prepaid vouchers in terms of Section 63.273 The 
last-mentioned refer to vouchers obtained in exchange for consideration, or prepaid 
vouchers. Prepaid vouchers may not expire until the date on which its full value was 
redeemed or three years after the date on which the voucher was issued.274 
 
Furthermore, a person is not allowed to offer participation in a loyalty programme or 
offer loyalty credits or awards should he/she have no intention to provide it or should 
he/she have the intention of providing it in a manner other than offered.275 Before a 
consumer joins a loyalty programme, the documented offer of the programme must 
disclose sufficient information to the consumer.276 The following information must be 
clearly set out in the offer: the nature of the programme, credit or award, the goods 
or service the offer relates to, the steps required of the consumer to participate in the 
programme or to receive the programme's benefits, and any person through whom, 
                                                 
269  S 1 sv "loyalty programme". 
270  S 1 sv "loyalty programme". 
271  S 35(1). 
272  A provision stating that loyalty credits or awards expire after a certain time could possibly 
constitute an unfair contract term under S 48. 
273  Also see 3.9.2 in the article. 
274  S 63(2). 
275  S 35(2). 
276  S 35(3). 
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place and time at which the consumer may get access to the programme, credits or 
awards.277 The sponsor of a loyalty programme or supplier who is willing to accept 
loyalty credits or rewards in consideration for goods or services has, inter alia, a duty 
to ensure that goods or services are available in a sufficient quantity in order to meet 
the anticipated demand as a result of such a programme, that the goods or services 
are not of an inferior quality, not to charge administration or processing fees, and not 
to place an obligation on a consumer to purchase any other goods or services.278 
The availability of goods or services under a loyalty programme may only be 
restricted by a supplier should the programme consumers have received written 
notice279 of that restriction at least twenty business days before the restriction 
begins, and the total period of that restriction must not exceed ninety days per 
year.280 The same ground of justification or exclusion that applies to bait marketing 
and trade coupons and promotional offers applies to loyalty programmes.281 
 
3.5.8 Promotional competitions 
 
A "promotional competition" is any competition, game, scheme, arrangement, 
system, plan or device distributing a prize by lot or chance, that is conducted in the 
ordinary course of business,282 for the purposes of promoting, and in which the prize 
exceeds the threshold prescribed by the Minister in terms of Section 36(11).283 The 
Act prohibits a person from directly or indirectly informing a consumer that he/she 
has won a competition should no competition have been conducted; that he/she has 
in fact not won a competition, in which the competition is subject to an undisclosed 
condition; or in a case in which the consumer is required to offer further 
consideration for the prize after the competition results had already been 
announced.284 The Act further prohibits a person from directly or indirectly informing 
a consumer that he/she has a right to a prize if the person in fact has no right, should 
                                                 
277  S 35(3)(a)–(d). 
278  See 34(4)(a)–(f) for all the duties. 
279  The notice may be given directly or indirectly. An example of an indirect notice could be a notice 
on the door or walls of the supplier's business. However, an indirect written notice may never 
come to the attention of a consumer and would therefore, in some cases, serve no purpose. 
280  S 35(5). These periods in terms of S 36(10) also apply, with the necessary changes, to 
promotional competitions. Also see 3.5.8 in the article. 
281  S 34(6). See 3.5.2 and 3.5.6 in the article. 
282  Once-off promotional competitions will therefore fall outside the application of this provision. 
283  S 36(1)(d). S 36(1) also contains the definitions of "participant", "prize" and "promoter". 
284  S 36(2)(a). 
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the prize have been offered to all similarly situated persons or a class of persons, or, 
should the consumer, before becoming eligible to receive the prize, be required to 
offer further consideration or to purchase goods or services.285 It appears that this 
provision also prohibits a supplier from informing a consumer that he/she has won a 
competition but has to attend a meeting or visit a specific place to claim his/her prize 
or to become eligible to receive the prize. Generally, a promoter must not require a 
consumer to pay any consideration in a promotional competition, except for 
reasonable costs of posting or transmitting an entry form.286 Consideration here 
refers to any consideration paid directly or indirectly for an opportunity in or access to 
a promotional competition, requiring a consumer to buy goods or services at a higher 
price than the ordinary price in order to participate in a promotional competition.287 
Therefore, a promotional competition requiring consideration from a consumer in 
order to participate is prohibited. The Act also prohibits promoters from awarding a 
prize to certain persons such as directors, members, suppliers or agents of the 
promoter or the promoted goods or services.288 In order to ensure transparency, a 
promoter must, before a competition begins, prepare competition rules and make 
them available to the Commission and to any participant on request and without 
cost.289 A copy of these rules must also be retained for a prescribed period after the 
end of the competition.290 In order to ensure sufficient disclosure of information to a 
consumer, the Act requires that certain minimum information must be disclosed and 
stated in an offer to participate in a promotional competition.291 The minimum 
information includes the basis on which results will be determined and the medium 
through which the results will be made known. This further prevents promoters from 
conducting promotional competitions without announcing the winners. These 
disclosure requirements do not imply that promotional competitions must only be in 
writing. The information may be disclosed directly on any medium through which 
                                                 
285  S 36(2)(b). 
286  S 36(3)(a). In terms of Ss 36(7) and 36(8), the right to participate in a promotional competition or 
the right to any benefit should not be deferred or made subject to further conditions by a 
promoter, such as paying consideration. 
287  S 36(4). 
288  S 36(3)(b)(ii). 
289  S 36(3)(c). 
290  S 36(3)(c). 
291  S 36(5).  
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consumers participate or in any accompanying document or in advertisements 
associated with the competition and published during the time of the competition.292  
 
3.5.9 Alternative work schemes 
 
In general terms, Section 37 prohibits any person from making false representations 
in respect of the availability, actual or potential profitability, risk or any material 
aspect of work, business or an activity involved in any arrangement for gain.293 In 
terms of this provision, an advertisement, for example, stating "Work from home: 
R25 000 guaranteed" is prohibited, unless it contains the minimum required 
information. These arrangements are arrangements in terms of which a person 
invites, solicits or requires persons to conduct work or business from their homes, 
represents to others as being practicable to conduct the business or work from their 
homes, or invites, solicits or requires persons to perform work or business or invest 
money from their homes.294 Advertisements promoting these arrangements must be 
accompanied by a cautionary statement in the prescribed wording and form.295 The 
cautionary statement must disclose the uncertainty of the extent of the work, 
business or activity and the income or benefit to be derived from it.296 The full name 
or registered business name of the promoter, as well as the address and contact 
number of his, her or its primary place of business and the nature of the work, 
business or activity must be disclosed in the advertisement.297 A consumer may not 
be charged fees, except to the extent that the supplier performed the work or 
business activity, or made or received the contemplated investment.298 Should a 
consumer, for example, be offered a business opportunity in which an income of 
R25 000 per month is guaranteed, no fees may be charged before the consumer in 
fact received the money.  
                                                 
292  S 36(6). 
293  S 37(1). 
294  S 37(1). 
295  S 37(2). 
296  S 37(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
297  S 37(2)(b). 
298  S 37(4). This provision refers to "person" rather than consumer and supplier in order to ensure 
the wide application of this provision. However, for the sake of convenience and for purposes of 
explaining this provision, the authors referred to consumer and supplier. 
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3.5.10 Referral selling 
 
Referral selling is, for example, a case in which a consumer accepts an offer to buy 
goods or services on the representation that he/she will receive a benefit if he/she 
gives the names of other consumers to a supplier or assists the supplier in supplying 
the goods or services to other consumers and the receipt of the benefit is made 
subject to a further event occurring after the consumer agreed to the transaction. An 
example is a case in which a consumer receives a discount on accommodation if 
he/she supplies the contact details of ten other consumers to the supplier. This type 
of marketing is prohibited.299 However, this provision does not prohibit a supplier 
from obtaining from the consumer the contact details of other consumers, so long as 
it is not a requirement for receiving the promised rebate, commission or discount. 
Although a consumer can therefore not be forced to supply the contact details of 
other consumers, the consumer can voluntarily, on request, provide the information 
to a supplier. It is uncertain whether this provision has the aim of protecting a 
consumer's right to privacy. If it is indeed the aim, its execution will be prevented, 
since this provision in effect allows violation of a consumer's right to privacy. 
Furthermore, the question may be asked whether a consumer who provides, on 
request, the contact details of another consumer to a supplier is not violating or 
enabling the violation of the other consumer's right to privacy.  
 
3.5.11 Agreements with persons lacking legal capacity 
 
An agreement with, or an agreement to enter into a transaction for the supply of 
goods or services to or at the direction of a consumer who, subject to a court order, 
is mentally unfit, is void should the supplier have known or could have reasonably 
determined that the consumer was subject to such order.300 One may ask if a 
consumer then enters into an agreement with a mentally unfit person and the 
supplier did not know or could not have reasonably determined that a person is 
subject to such court order, whether the contract would be valid. In terms of the 
common law, the position is the same in respect of an agreement being void should 
                                                 
299  S 38. This section does not apply to franchise agreements. 
300  S 39(1)(a). 
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one contract party be mentally unfit. However, in terms of the common law, it makes 
no difference should the supplier have known or not have known of the other 
person's mental illness, since the requirement of ratio or reason is then missing.301 
The agreement is voidable at the option of the consumer should the consumer have 
been an unemancipated minor at the time the agreement was concluded, in which 
the agreement was concluded without the consent of an adult responsible for the 
minor, and in which the agreement was not ratified by the adult or the consumer after 
being emancipated or becoming an adult.302 This provision does not apply should the 
consumer or someone acting on behalf of the consumer, directly or indirectly, by act 
or by omission, have induced a supplier to believe that the consumer had legal 
capacity to contract, or have attempted to suppress the fact that the consumer did 
not have full legal capacity to contract.303 
 
3.6 The right to fair and honest dealing 
 
One of the aims of the Consumer Protection Act is to protect consumers from 
unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or improper trade practices and any 
deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct.304 This is done, inter alia, by 
regulating unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations, 
fraudulent schemes and offers, pyramid schemes, auctions, waivers, deferrals, 
substitution of goods, and over-selling and over-booking.305  
 
3.6.1 Unconscionable conduct 
 
Unconscionable conduct in essence means conduct having a character 
contemplated in Section 40, or other improper or unethical conduct that would be 
improper or unethical to a degree that would shock the conscience of a reasonable 
person.306 Section 40 prohibits the use of physical force against consumers; 
coercion; undue influence; pressure; duress or harassment; unfair tactics; or any 
                                                 
301  Christie Law of Contract 247. 
302  S 39(1)(b). This is also the common law position. See Davel and Jordaan Law of Persons 75–90. 
303  S 39(2). The common-law position in respect of fraudulent minors is also the same. See Davel 
and Jordaan Law of Persons 75–90 and Christie Law of Contract 239–243. 
304  S 3(1)(d). 
305  Chp 2 Part F. 
306  S 1 sv "unconscionable". 
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similar conduct in connection with the marketing and supply of goods or services, 
negotiations, conclusion, execution or enforcement of a contract for the supply of 
goods or services to consumers or demand of or collection of payment for goods or 
services or recovery of goods from consumers.307 In terms of common law, duress 
and undue influence are also prohibited.308 When absolute force is used, an 
agreement will be void ab initio, and when relative force or undue influence is used, 
the agreement will be voidable at the choice of the consumer.309 Section 40 therefore 
codifies common law, but has a wider ambit. Under common law, duress and undue 
influence are based on the idea that undue influence and duress render a contract 
void or voidable, depending on the facts, because it influences a person's will and 
leads to improper obtaining of consensus. However, Section 40 of the Act deals not 
only with consensus obtained by improper means, but also with other improper or 
unethical conduct in marketing, supply, negotiation, execution, enforcement, and so 
forth.310 In effect, Section 40 reinforces the idea that parties to a contract should act 
in good faith, and that their conduct should not be improper, unconscionable and 
against the boni mores.311 The Act further expands the ambit of the unconscionable 
conduct provision by stating that it is also unconscionable for suppliers to knowingly 
take advantage because a consumer was unable to protect his/her own interests 
because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to understand 
the language of an agreement or any similar factor.312 This provision therefore, in 
effect, places a heavy burden on suppliers to ensure that consumers understand 
agreements.  
                                                 
307  S 40(1); also see S 51. 
308  Christie Law of Contract 301–311 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 117–129. See Broodryk v 
Smuts 1942 TPD 47 for an example of duress. Also see Preller v Jordaan 1956 1 SA 483 (A). 
309  Christie Law of Contract 301–311 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 117–129. 
310  In Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos Bpk 1986 1 SA 819 (A) para 848, in which the 
court, for the first time, pointed out that rescission should not be restricted to the three traditional 
grounds of undue influence, duress and misrepresentation. Also see Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 130–135. 
311  Van der Merwe et al Contract 131–135 for a discussion of one general ground for the rescission 
of agreements. 
312  S 40(2). 
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3.6.2 False, misleading or deceptive representations 
 
As stated above,313 suppliers are not allowed to use false, misleading or deceptive 
representation, innuendo, exaggeration or ambiguity, or must not knowingly allow 
consumers to believe false, misleading or deceptive facts.314 A representation will be 
a false, misleading or deceptive representation to falsely state or imply or fail to 
correct misapprehension on the part of the consumer that: (a) a supplier has a 
particular status or affiliation, connection, sponsorship or approval that he, she or it 
does not have; (b) that any goods or services have, inter alia, ingredients, 
characteristics, uses, accessories that they do not have; or (c) are of a particular 
standard, are new or unused if they are not.315 The same applies to any land or 
immovable property with regard to (a) characteristics that it does not have; (b) the 
purpose of the land; or (c) the facilities and features of the land.316 
 
3.6.3 Fraudulent schemes and offers 
 
In essence, Section 42 prohibits any person from directly or indirectly promoting, 
knowingly joining or participating in a fraudulent currency scheme,317 a fraudulent 
financial transaction,318 fraudulent transfer of property or legal rights319 or any other 
scheme declared fraudulent by the Minister in terms of Section 42(8).320 The authors 
are familiar with the existence of numerous such schemes in South Africa, especially 
multiplications schemes, and several cases that involved these schemes are 
currently before the courts. Whether this provision will prevent such schemes from 
arising remains to be seen.  
 
                                                 
313  See 3.5.1 in the article. 
314  S 41(1). Is this the same as common law misrepresentation? Misrepresentation in terms of the 
common law is where a prospective contract party bases his/her decision to conclude an 
agreement on a false representation by the other party to the negotiations. See Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 105–117. 
315  S 41(3)(a)–(b). This list is not exhaustive. 
316  S 41(3)(c). This list is not exhaustive 
317  Ss 42(2)(a) and 42(3). For example, representing, with the intention of defrauding a person, that 
someone is capable of increasing a sum of money. 
318  Ss 42(2)(b) and 42(4). For example, a transaction that involves the proceeds of an unlawful 
activity. 
319  Ss 42(2)(c) and 42(5). For example, fraudulently obtaining property from a person. 
320  Ss 42(2)(d) and 42(8) and the regulations to this Act in terms of S 120. 
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3.6.4 Pyramid and related schemes 
 
In terms of Section 43(2), a person is prohibited from directly or indirectly or 
knowingly joining, promoting or entering into a multiplication scheme,321 a pyramid 
scheme,322 a chain letter scheme323 or any scheme declared by the Minister as such 
in Section 43(6) and in terms of Section 120 and the regulations to the Act.324 It 
appears that so-called "network marketing schemes" do not constitute pyramid 
schemes because compensation is usually derived primarily from the sale of goods 
and services, and not only from recruitment of new participants. 
 
3.6.5 The consumer's right to assume that a supplier is entitled to sell goods 
 
In terms of Section 44(1), every consumer has a right to assume that a supplier will 
have a legal right or the authority of the owner to supply, sell or lease goods.325 The 
consumer also has a right to assume that between a supplier and a consumer, the 
supplier is fully liable for any charge or encumbrance pertaining to the goods in 
favour of third parties, for example outstanding debt on a car.326 Furthermore, a 
consumer has a right to assume that the supplier guarantees that he/she will have 
                                                 
321  S 43(3). A multiplication scheme exists when a person offers, promises or guarantees to a 
consumer (or investor or participant) an effective interest rate that is at least twenty per cent 
above the repurchase rate determined by the Reserve Bank at the date of investment or 
commencement of participation. It will still constitute a multiplication scheme even should the 
consumer, investor or participant become a member of the lending party. In terms of S 43(1), the 
definition of "participant" is any person who is admitted to a scheme for consideration. 
322  S 43(4). An arrangement, agreement, practice or scheme is a pyramid scheme if: (a) a 
participant to the scheme receives compensation that is derived primarily from his/her 
recruitment of other participants rather than from the sale of goods or services; or (b) the 
emphasis in the promotion of the scheme indicates an arrangement contemplated in 
subparagraph (c). 
323  S 43(5). An arrangement, agreement, practice or scheme will be a chain letter scheme if it has 
various levels of participation, existing participants recruit new participants, and each newly 
recruited participant is required, upon joining the scheme, to pay certain consideration, which is 
distributed to one or some of the previously existing participants, irrespective of whether the new 
participant received goods or services in exchange for consideration, and each newly recruited 
participant is, upon joining, assigned to the lowest level of participation in the scheme. Then, 
upon recruiting new participants, these participants may participate in distribution of the 
consideration paid by new recruits and may move to higher levels within the scheme until being 
removed from the scheme after reaching the highest level. 
324  S 43(2)(a)–(d). 
325  S 44(1)(a)–(b). 
326  S 44(1)(c). The supplier will not be liable to a third party if the charge or encumbrance is 
disclosed in writing to a consumer before an agreement is concluded, or if the supplier and 
consumer have colluded to defraud the third party. 
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and enjoy quiet possession of the goods, subject to any charge or encumbrance.327 
These rights are implied provisions in every transaction and agreement.328 Should 
any transaction or agreement for the supply of goods to a consumer infringe a right 
or claim of a third party pertaining to those goods, the supplier is liable to the third 
party to the extent of the infringement, except in a case in which a charge or 
encumbrance was disclosed to the consumer before entering into an agreement.329  
 
Goods include a legal interest in land,330 and one could therefore ask whether 
contracts of lease will be influenced by Section 44 should a lessor decide to sell 
leased property. Further, would this provision influence the common law "huur gaat 
voor koop" rule? As stated above, in terms of Section 44(1)(c), a consumer has a 
right to assume that between a supplier and a consumer, the supplier is fully liable 
for any charge or encumbrance pertaining to the goods in favour of third parties. 
Does that mean that a lessee will no longer be able to rely on the "huur gaat voor 
koop" rule should the owner of the leased land sell it, and that the lessee will no 
longer be protected against the new owner of the land? Section 44(2) provides that 
should any transaction or agreement for the supply of goods to a consumer infringe 
a right or claim pertaining to those goods by a third party, the supplier is liable to the 
third party to the extent of the infringement. It is therefore uncertain whether this 
provision of the Act will affect contracts in respect of lease of land. It appears that 
Section 44 does not have any effect on the "huur gaat voor koop" rule, because in 
terms of this rule, hire takes precedence over sale, and in terms of Section 44(2), the 
supplier is not liable to a third party (the new owner) should the encumbrance have 
been disclosed before they entered into an agreement. 
 
It appears that Section 44 also corresponds with a purchaser's common law warranty 
against eviction,331 a lessor's duty to ensure the lessee's undisturbed use and 
enjoyment of the leased property, and the common law warranty by the lessor that 
no one with a better title will interfere with the lessee's use and enjoyment of the 
leased property. 
                                                 
327  S 44(1)(d). 
328  S 44(1). 
329  S 44(2). 
330  See 2.5 in the article. 
331  See Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A) and Mdakane v Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd 1999 1 SA 127 (W) for analyses of the warranty against eviction. 
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3.6.6 Auctions 
 
In cases in which goods are put up for sale by auction in lots, each lot is regarded to 
be the subject of a separate transaction, unless there is evidence to the contrary.332 
A sale by auction is only complete when an auctioneer announces its end by the fall 
of the hammer or any other customary manner.333 Before the end of any auction, a 
bid may be retracted.334 Should an auction be subject to a reserved or upset price or 
a right to bid by or on behalf of the owner or auctioneer, notice of this must be given 
in advance.335 Should this notice not have been given in advance, the owner or 
auctioneer must not bid or employ any person to bid at the auction and knowingly 
accept any bid from such person.336 Should an auctioneer violate this subsection by 
bidding by or on behalf of himself, herself, itself or an owner without giving the 
required advance notice, a consumer may approach a court to declare the 
transaction fraudulent.337 An auction in terms of this section includes a sale in 
execution by auction pursuant to a court order.338 The Minister has the power to 
prescribe further requirements to be complied with by auctioneers or different 
categories of auctioneers in respect of conduct at an auction, records to be 
maintained with respect to property placed for auction, and the sale of such property 
by auction.339 Inter alia, this section will prevent auctioneers of execution sales 
bidding at auctions and abusing their positions or power. It also prevents an owner 
from bidding at his, her or its own auction and thereby artificially increasing the price 
of the goods subject to the auction should he, she or it have not in advance 
disclosed the fact that he, she or it will bid at the auction. It, however, appears that 
banks or other financial institutions will not be prevented from bidding at land 
repossession auctions (execution auctions) of property they had repossessed, as a 
bank is at that moment not the auctioneer or the owner of the repossessed property. 
 
                                                 
332  S 45(2). 
333  S 45(3). 
334  S 45(3). 
335  S 45(4). 
336  S 45(5)(a)–(b). 
337  S 45(5)(c). 
338  S 45(1). 
339  S 45(6). 
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3.6.7 Changes, deferrals, waivers and substitution of goods 
 
Should goods or services be supplied as a result of a change to an existing 
agreement, or a deferral or waiver of a right under an existing agreement, it must not 
be treated as a new agreement for the purposes of this Act, should the change, 
deferral or waiver be made in accordance with the agreement or this Act.340 
Furthermore, should, after delivery of goods to a consumer, a consumer and supplier 
agree to substitute other goods for all or part of the goods sold, the transaction 
applies to the substituted goods rather than the original goods from the date of 
delivery of the substituted goods.341 Should this transaction have been subject to a 
written agreement or sales record, the supplier has to prepare and deliver to the 
consumer an amended agreement or sales record, describing the substituted goods, 
without making any other changes to the original document.342 
 
3.6.8 Over-selling and over-booking 
 
In terms of the Act, a supplier is not allowed to accept payment or any consideration 
for goods or services should he, she or it have no reasonable intention to supply 
those goods or services or should he, she or it intend to supply goods or services 
that are materially different from the goods or services in respect of which payment 
was accepted.343 Furthermore, should a supplier make a commitment or accept a 
reservation to supply goods or services at a specific date or time and should he, she 
or it then fail to do so because of insufficient stock or capacity to supply those, 
similar, better or comparable goods or services, the supplier has to refund the 
consumer the amount, together with interest at the prescribed rate from the date on 
which the amount was paid until the date of reimbursement. In addition, the 
consumer must be compensated for costs "directly incidental" to the supplier's 
breach of contract.344 In terms of the common law, a consumer is able to claim all 
general damages and only special damages that flow from breach of contract should 
the law presume that the parties contemplated that those damages would result from 
                                                 
340  S 46(1). 
341  S 46(2)(a). 
342  S 46(2)(b). 
343  S 47(2). 
344  S 47(3)(a)–(b). 
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such breach of contract.345 However, in terms of Section 47(3)(a)–(b), it appears a 
supplier will not be liable for consequential damages because consequential 
damages are not directly incidental to the breach of contract. 
 
Furthermore, a supplier will not be liable for the additional costs of the consumer 
should the shortage of stock or capacity be due to circumstances beyond the 
supplier's control and the supplier took reasonable steps to inform the consumer of 
the shortage of stock or capacity as soon as he, she or it was able to do so in the 
circumstances.346 To prevent the supplier from raising the "beyond the supplier's 
control" defence, a shortage of stock or capacity will not be "due to circumstances 
beyond the supplier's control" should the shortage result partially, completely, 
directly or indirectly from a failure on the part of the supplier to diligently carry out 
any routine matter in his, her or its business.347 For example, an airplane that cannot 
take off on the scheduled time due to technical errors caused by the supplier's failure 
to service or to clean the airplane on time will not be circumstances beyond the 
supplier's control. Therefore, in terms of this section, a supplier is prohibited from 
over-booking and over-selling goods or services. For example, the practice of 
airlines over-selling and over-booking air tickets is prohibited. 
 
3.7 The right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions 
 
Freedom of contract forms the basis of the South African contract law. The reason is 
that the parties have come to an agreement, and the basis of the law of contract is 
that the law will enforce their agreement.348 Therefore, no paternalistic intervention 
by courts on the basis that an agreement or a clause appears to be unreasonable 
existed in a previous era in which contracts were negotiated and parties were in an 
equal bargaining position.349 This absolute principle was, however, whittled away by 
the common law, which will not enforce a contract if it is contrary to public policy.350 
                                                 
345  Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 550. 
346  S 47(5). 
347  S 47(6). 
348  See Christie Law of Contract 14 in which Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 
is referred to. 
349  Christie Law of Contract 14. 
350  Christie Law of Contract 14. See, for example, law of contract regarding restraint of trade in 
Magna Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 847 (A). 
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South Africa has a long history of law moving from not accepting any limitation of 
freedom of contract to the Act that regulates law regarding fair, just and reasonable 
contract terms. One can observe progression in the development of measures 
addressing contractual unfairness from the day the case of Bank of Lisbon and 
South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas351 was decided until now, in this era, where non-
negotiated and standard term contracts are used. In the Bank of Lisbon case, the 
court held that there had to be strict adherence to the terms of a contract, and that 
the exceptio doli generalis could not be used to deal with unfairness, since it did not 
form part of the South African law.352 The court, however, held in the minority 
judgement that freedom of contract and the principles of pacta sunt servanda were 
not absolute principles, and that the exceptio doli formed a substantive defence 
against contractual unfairness.353 Thereafter, in the case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes,354 the court held that it has the power to refuse to enforce contracts that 
were against public policy or contrary to good morals,355 a power that was applied 
sparingly. Nine years later, the Law Commission, in its report,356 proposed unfair 
contract legislations against contractual unfairness, unreasonableness, and 
unconscionability in all the contractual phases.357 In 2004, the DTI, in its Draft Green 
paper,358 proposed that rather than enacting separate unfair contracts legislation, 
general provisions regarding unfair contracts had to be inserted into consumer law. 
The aim was to enact law to provide not only what the rights and responsibilities of 
the parties were, but also to promote the use of plain language in consumer 
contracts, and, in addition, to give examples of unfair contract terms through 
guidelines that build on international precedents.359 In Part G of Chapter 2, the Act 
now contains measures dealing with unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms. 
One of the aims of the Act is to protect consumers against unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or improper practices.360 
 
                                                 
351  1988 3 SA 580 (A) – hereafter Bank of Lisbon. 
352  Bank of Lisbon 605. 
353  Bank of Lisbon 612. 
354  1989 1 SA 1 (A) – hereafter Sasfin. 
355  Sasfin paras 7–9. 
356  South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations xiii. 
357  Where the contract came into existence, when executed and when enforced. 
358  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 paras 30–31. 
359  GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 paras 30–31. 
360  S 3(1)(d). 
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3.7.1 Unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms 
 
Firstly, a supplier must not supply, offer to supply or enter into an agreement to 
supply goods or services at a price or on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust.361 Secondly, a supplier is not allowed to market any goods or services, or 
negotiate, or enter into a transaction or agreement for the supply of goods or 
services in a manner that is unfair, unjust or unreasonable.362 Thirdly, a supplier 
must not require a consumer or a person to whom goods or services are supplied at 
the consumer's direction to waive any rights, assume any obligation or waive any 
liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose 
any such terms as a condition of entering into a transaction.363  
 
A transaction, an agreement, a term or condition or a notice is unfair, 
unreasonable364 or unjust (a) should it be excessively one-sided in favour of any 
person other than a consumer;365 (b) should the terms of the agreement or 
transaction be so adverse to the consumer that it is inequitable;366 or (c) should a 
consumer have relied to his/her detriment on a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation367 or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of a supplier.368 
A "statement of opinion" includes any opinion, and not only false, misleading or 
                                                 
361  S 48(1)(a). One could ask whether the abolished laesio enormis doctrine is being revived again 
in respect of price. See Van der Merwe et al Contract 132 for a discussion of the laesio enormis 
doctrine. 
362  S 48(1)(b). 
363  S 48(1)(c). 
364  In Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 323 (CC) para 36, the court held that in an instance in which a 
court has to decide whether the terms of a contract are contrary to public policy, the 
considerations of reasonableness and fairness must be considered. In para 56, the court held 
that there are two questions to ask in determining fairness: "The first is whether the clause itself 
is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light 
of the circumstances which prevented compliance with the … clause." In para 57, the court held 
that the question of reasonableness involves the weighing-up of two considerations: "On the one 
hand, public policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires, in general, that parties should 
comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily undertaken. This 
consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, which, as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has repeatedly noted, gives effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and 
dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment, is 
the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was 
freely and voluntarily concluded is clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should 
be afforded to the values of freedom and dignity." The other consideration is the specific 
fundamental right involved in a case.  
365  S 48(2)(a). 
366  S 48(2)(b). 
367  S 41. 
368  S 48(2)(c). 
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deceptive opinions, since "statement of opinion" is not qualified here. A term or 
agreement can therefore be declared unfair, unreasonable or unjust should a 
consumer have relied on an opinion of the supplier, and suppliers, such as attorneys, 
advocates and medical practitioners, should take notice of this. Furthermore, it will 
also be unfair, unreasonable or unjust (d) should the transaction or agreement have 
been subject to a term or condition or a notice for which a notice in terms of Section 
49(1) is required, and the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
unconscionable, or the fact, nature and effect of the term, condition or notice was not 
drawn to the consumer's attention as required by Section 49(1).369  
 
The court will consider several factors in order to decide whether an agreement or 
transaction will be unfair, unreasonable, or unjust.370 These factors include  
(a) the fair value of the goods and services;  
(b) the nature of the parties to the agreement or transaction;  
(c) the parties' relationship to each other;  
(d) the parties' relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and 
bargaining position;  
(e) the circumstances of the agreement or transaction that existed or were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the transaction, agreement or conduct, 
irrespective of whether the Act was in force at that time;371  
(f) the conduct of the supplier and of the consumer;  
(g) whether the parties negotiated, and if they did, the extent of the negotiation;  
(h) whether a consumer was required to do anything that was not reasonably 
necessary for the legitimate interest of the supplier;  
(i) whether, and the extent to which, the Section 22 plain and understandable 
language requirements were complied with;372  
(j) whether a consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence 
of a provision of the agreement that is alleged to have been unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust when having regard to custom of trade and previous dealings between 
the parties;  
                                                 
369  S 48(2)(d). 
370  S 52(2). The same factors apply to Ss 40 and 41. 
371  It is uncertain whether this part of the Act then applies to pre-existing agreements. 
372  See 3.4.1 in the article. With regard to negotiation as a factor, see 3.7.5 in the article where the 
influence of taking into account negotiations on the parol evidence rule is mentioned. 
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(k) the amount for and the circumstance under which a consumer could have 
acquired the same or equivalent goods or service from another supplier; and  
(l) where goods were supplied, whether the goods were manufactured or adapted 
to a consumer's special order.373 
 
3.7.2 Notice required for certain terms and conditions 
 
This section prevents a consumer from entering into an agreement that contains 
provisions that could affect his/her rights or that could be unexpected, should the 
consumer not be aware of its existence.374 Therefore, should an agreement contain 
specific terms and conditions as set out in Section 49(1), these must be brought to 
the attention of the consumer in the prescribed form and manner.375 These types of 
terms are terms that purport to limit in any way the liability or risk of the supplier or 
someone else; that constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer; and 
that impose an obligation on a consumer to indemnify the supplier or someone else 
for any cause, and an acknowledgment of any fact by the consumer.376 These terms 
would include clauses to the effect that no representations were made to a 
consumer, as well as indemnity clauses and exemption clauses. Furthermore, 
should a provision concern any activity or facility that is subject to risk of an unusual 
character or nature, or risks of which the consumer could not reasonably be 
expected to be aware of, or which could result in serious injury or death, the supplier 
has to specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of the risk to the attention 
of the consumer in the prescribed form and manner.377 Furthermore, the consumer 
has to assent to that provision or notice by signing or initialling the provision.378 In 
respect of form and manner, such notice or provision must be in plain and 
understandable language as contemplated in Section 22, and the consumer must be 
given sufficient time and opportunity in the circumstances to receive and 
                                                 
373  S 52(2)(a)–(j). 
374  Also see Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 572 (SCA) para 33, where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that a clause that undermines the essence of a contract and a hidden clause should 
be clearly and pertinently brought to the attention of a client who signs a standard contract. In 
this regard, also see Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 499–501. 
375  S 49(3) and (5). 
376  S 49(1)(a)–(d). 
377  S 49(2). The form and manner are prescribed in Ss 49(3) and 49(5). Also see 3.8.6 in the article 
for a discussion of S 58. 
378  S 49(2). 
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comprehend the provision or notice.379 The Act further places a duty on a supplier or 
other person to draw the attention of a consumer in a conspicuous manner and form 
that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinary alert consumer to the fact, nature 
and effect of the provision or notice.380 This must be done at the earliest before the 
consumer enters into the agreement or transaction, begins to engage in the activity 
or enters or gains access to a facility, or before the consumer is required to offer 
consideration for the agreement or transaction.381 A supplier can therefore minimise 
his, her or its liability for unfair contract terms by (a) drawing the attention of the 
consumer to the fact, nature or effect of a clause or notice (b) in plain language and 
(c) by giving a consumer adequate opportunity to comprehend the notice or 
provision. 
 
3.7.3 Written consumer agreements 
 
In terms of Section 50(1), the Minister may prescribe categories of agreements that 
should be in writing. If an agreement between a supplier and consumer is in writing, 
as required in terms of the Act or voluntarily, the agreement is valid, irrespective of 
whether the consumer signed the agreement.382 This provision works against the 
consumer and may be exploited by fraudulent suppliers who pretend that 
agreements were concluded with suppliers. The supplier must, however, still provide 
a free copy of the agreement to the consumer.383 In terms of this section, the copy 
can also be free electronic access to a copy of the agreement. This can be to the 
detriment of vulnerable consumers who do not have access to computers. 
 
The agreement also has to be in plain and understandable language in terms of 
Section 22, and it must set out an itemised break-down of the financial obligations of 
the consumer under the agreement.384 Should an agreement not be required to be in 
writing, a supplier must at least, as prescribed, keep a record of transactions entered 
into over the telephone or another recordable form.385 
                                                 
379  S 49(3) and (5). 
380  S 49(4)(1)(a). 
381  S 49(4)(1)(b). 
382  S 50(2)(a). 
383  S 50(2)(b).  
384  S 50(2)(b). 
385  S 50(3). 
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3.7.4 Prohibited transactions, agreements, terms or conditions 
 
In terms of Section 51, the Act prohibits agreements or terms that have the purpose 
of defeating the purpose of the Act, misleading or deceiving a consumer, or terms 
that subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct.386  
 
A term or an agreement may also not directly or indirectly purport to waive or deprive 
consumers of their rights387 in terms of the Act, avoid a supplier's duty in terms of the 
Act, or authorise a supplier to do something that is unlawful in terms of this Act or fail 
to do something that is required in terms of the Act.388  
 
Section 51(1)(c) prohibits a supplier from using exemption or indemnity agreements 
or terms that limit or exempt a supplier from liability for any loss attributable389 to the 
gross negligence of the supplier or someone on his, her or its behalf.390 It also 
prohibits the use of agreements or terms that constitute an assumption of risk or 
liability by the consumer for these damages. Lastly, an agreement or term may not 
impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to goods displayed by a 
supplier.391 Therefore, a notice in terms of which a consumer will be liable for the 
damage to goods displayed will not be permitted in terms of this section. 
 
Furthermore, Section 51 has several prohibitions, such as agreements or terms 
resulting from an offer prohibited in Section 31;392 requiring consumers to enter into 
supplementary contracts;393 purporting to cede or set off a consumer's right to claim 
against the Guardian Fund;394 falsely expressing an acknowledgement by a 
consumer that no representations or warranties were made before an agreement 
                                                 
386  S 51(1)(a). It is therefore void ab initio. 
387  Chp 2 contains the consumer's fundamental rights in terms of this Act. 
388  S 51(1)(b). 
389  This includes direct or indirect loss. 
390  In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 35, the court remarked that liability 
for gross negligence (medical) could possibly be excluded. In terms of the Act, it is now 
prohibited. 
391 A consumer is not responsible for any loss to goods displayed by a supplier, unless the loss 
results from a consumer's gross negligence, malicious behaviour or criminal conduct (see S 
18(1)).  
392  S 51(1)(d). 
393  S 51(1)(e). 
394  S 51(1)(f). Also see S 86 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. 
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was made, or that a consumer has received goods, services or a required 
document;395 requiring a consumer to forfeit money to a supplier should the 
consumer exercise his/her rights in terms of this Act or to which the supplier is not 
entitled to;396 expressing an authorisation for the supplier or someone on his, her or 
its behalf to enter any premises for the purpose of taking possession of goods, 
undertaking to sign in advance documents relating to enforcement, or a consent to a 
predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement;397 expressing an agreement 
by the consumer to deposit a bank card or identity document or provide a pin code or 
number to be used to access an account.398  
 
A supplier is also not allowed to require a consumer to enter into a supplementary 
agreement or sign any document in terms of which the consumer enters into an 
agreement that contains a prohibited term in terms of Section 51(1),399 or gives 
temporary or permanent possession of his/her bank card or identification document 
or reveals his/her pin or other access number to an account to a supplier.400 
 
Any agreement or term that contravenes Section 51 is void to the extent that it 
contravenes Section 51.401 
 
3.7.5 Powers of the court to ensure fair and just conduct, terms and conditions 
 
If unconscionable conduct in terms of Section 40, false, misleading or deceptive 
representations in terms of Section 41, or unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract 
terms in terms of Section 48 are alleged in court proceedings, or if the Act does not 
give a sufficient remedy to correct the prohibited conduct, unfairness, injustice or 
unconscionability, the court has to consider the factors listed in Section 52(2)402 and 
the principles, purposes and provisions of the Act before a court order can be made 
                                                 
395  S 51(1)(g). Such terms may therefore still be used but they may not be false. 
396  S 51(1)(h). 
397  S 51(1)(i). 
398  S 51(1)(i). 
399  S 51(2)(a). 
400  S 51(2)(b). However, this does not preclude a supplier from requiring a pin number or identity 
document in order to facilitate a transaction in the normal cause of business. 
401  S 51(3). 
402  See 3.7.1 in the article in which these factors are listed. 
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in terms of Section 52(3).403 One of the factors that the court must consider in terms 
of Section 52(2)(e) is whether there was any negotiation between the supplier and 
the consumer, and if so, the extent thereof. This will affect the parol evidence rule 
because, in terms of the parol evidence rule, a contract reduced to writing is 
generally the exclusive record of the transaction, and no evidence is admissible to 
prove the terms of the contract. 
 
In terms of this section, the court has the power to declare a transaction, wholly or 
partly, unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or unfair, or to make any reasonable or 
just order in the circumstances, including an order to compensate the consumer for 
losses or expenses relating to the transaction or the proceedings of the court, to 
restore money or property to the consumer, or to require the supplier to cease or 
alter any practice, form or document in order to prevent repetition of that conduct.404 
 
If an agreement, notice or terms are void in terms of the Act, or the requirement of 
written notice in terms of Section 49 was not satisfied, the court may declare the 
agreement, notice or terms void and sever the relevant part to render it lawful or 
declare the entire agreement, provision or notice ab initio void, or if the Section 49 
requirements were not satisfied, the court may sever the relevant part from the rest 
or declare it to have no force or effect in respect of the transaction.405 The court may 
also make any just or reasonable order in the circumstances.406 
 
In terms of the definition of "court" in Section 1, a consumer court is not a court. In 
terms of Section 1, a "consumer court" is defined as a body with that name or a 
consumer tribunal that has been established in terms of applicable provincial 
consumer legislation. Accordingly, the orders contemplated in Section 52 can only 
be made by a normal court of law and not by a consumer tribunal. However, in terms 
of Section 100(1), the Commission may issue a compliance notice to any person 
who engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act. Should the person then fail to comply 
with a compliance notice, the Commission may refer the matter to the National 
Prosecuting Authority for prosecution in terms of Section 110(2), or apply to the 
                                                 
403  S 52(1). 
404  S 52(3)(a)–(b). 
405  S 52(4)(a). 
406  S 52(4)(b). 
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Tribunal for the imposition of an administrative fine.407 In order to enforce any right in 
terms of the Act or to resolve any dispute with a supplier, a consumer408 may refer 
the matter directly to the Tribunal should the Act permit it,409 or refer the matter to the 
relevant ombud, apply to a court, refer the matter to an alternative dispute resolution 
agent in terms of Section 70, file a complaint with the Commission in terms of 
Section 71, or approach a court with jurisdiction should all other remedies available 
in terms of legislation have been exhausted.410 Therefore, Sections 52 and 69 are in 
a way contradictory. In terms of Section 69, a court should only be approached in 
order to enforce consumer rights should all other remedies be exhausted, while in 
terms of Section 52, the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions, and 
the right to honest and fair dealings can only be enforced by a court. It is problematic 
that only courts have jurisdiction in disputes regarding so-called "unfair" contracts, 
and this will increase the amount of court disputes and litigation. It is generally 
expensive for individual consumers to enforce their rights in court, and suppliers are 
well aware of this fact. Furthermore, should only courts have jurisdiction in unfair 
contract disputes, there will be no official body or tribunal with the authority to hear 
complaints and apply proactive preventative measures411 in order to ensure that 
unfair terms, contracts and unconscionable conduct are prevented in accordance 
with the principle that prevention is better than cure.412 
 
3.8 The right to fair value, good quality and safety413 
 
3.8.1 Applicable definitions414  
 
Part H of Chapter 2 of the Act contains its own definitions for the words "defect", 
"failure", "hazard", and "unsafe", which apply to that part of the Act in those instances 
                                                 
407  S 100(6). 
408  Or any other party in terms of S 4(1). 
409  S 69(a). 
410  S 69(b)–(d). 
411  See Naudé 2007 SALJ 128–164, in which grey and black lists as proactive preventative 
measures are discussed. In terms of a grey list, certain clauses or terms are regarded as unfair. 
412  Also see Naudé 2006 Stell LR 379–380, in which the inherent limits of judicial control of unfair 
contracts are discussed. 
413  Chp 2 Part H paras 53–61. 
414  S 53. 
W JACOBS, PN STOOP & R VAN NIEKERK                      PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
363/508 
 
in which they are used in respect of any goods, components of goods, or services.415 
A proper understanding of these definitions is necessary to determine whether Part 
H of Chapter 2 of the Act applies to a transaction. Unfortunately, not all the 
definitions are equally and sufficiently clear. 
 
A "defect"416 includes: 
 
(a) any material imperfection in the manufacture of goods (or components 
thereof), or in the performance of services, that causes the goods or the 
results of the services to be less acceptable than persons generally would 
reasonably be entitled to expect in the circumstances;417 or 
(b) any characteristic of goods (or components thereof) that results in the goods 
(or their components) being less useful, practicable or safe than persons 
generally would be reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances.418 
 
A material imperfection refers to a "relevant, pertinent, applicable, … vital, essential, 
key"419 fault. It is peculiar that the acceptability of goods or the result of services and 
the usefulness, practicability or safeness of goods (or components thereof) for 
purposes of determining whether they are defective are determined by what 
"persons generally would be reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances"420 
and not by what a "reasonable consumer or a consumer generally would reasonably 
expect".421 What is the significance of this, if any? The exact extent of the tests for 
defective goods or services will have to be determined on a case-by-case 
interpretation by our courts, taking all the relevant circumstances into account.422 
                                                 
415  S 53(1). 
416  S 53(1)(a) sv "defect". 
417  S 53(1)(a)(i). 
418  S 53(1)(a)(ii). 
419  Waite Little Oxford 289 sv "material". 
420  Emphasis added. 
421  S 1 sv "consumer" and "person". Again, see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in 
the article. Emphasis added. 
422  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 424–431 regarding "what persons generally would expect". 
They consider the European experience of the "consumer expectations" or "legitimate 
expectations" approach, and suggest that the definition of "defect" (in the Draft Consumer 
Protection Bill of 2006) had to be amended to do away with the "consumer expectations" test. 
Loubser and Reid propose that defectiveness has to be assessed in terms of a general standard 
of reasonableness with hindsight. Unfortunately, the definition of a defect in the Act still contains 
the "consumer expectations" test. Also, see Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 293 for 
comments on defective products under the common law. 
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"Failure" entails "the inability of goods to perform in the intended manner or to the 
intended effect".423 In contrast to the tests provided for a "defect", it is not clear to 
whose intention the "intended manner" or the "intended effect" refers. It may refer to 
the intention of the consumer, the supplier, persons generally, persons in the supply 
chain (the producer, importer, distributor or retailer), or to the joint intention of the 
consumer and the supplier in a transaction. 
 
A "hazard"424 refers to a characteristic that:  
 
(a) has been identified or declared as a hazard in terms of any other law;425 or 
(b) poses a significant risk of personal injury to any person, or damage to 
property, when the goods are used.426 
 
Note that goods are regarded as hazardous even if they pose a significant risk when 
the goods are used in their normal course. It is not necessary for the goods to 
present a significant risk when they are used for purposes for which they are not 
generally intended. What extent of risk is required to qualify as a "significant", as 
opposed to an ordinary, risk?427 The following may, inter alia, qualify as hazards: 
medicine, alcohol, tobacco, firearms and motor vehicles. The significant risk of 
personal injury is not limited to consumers, but extends to any person. Equally, the 
damage to property should not be confined to a consumer's property, but to any 
property.  
 
"Unsafe"428 means that goods pose an extreme risk of personal injury or property 
damage to consumers or to other persons owing to a characteristic, "failure", "defect" 
or "hazard". It is expressly provided that the risk of personal injury or damage to 
property extends to both consumers and other persons. An "extreme risk" may be 
                                                 
423  S 53(1)(b) sv "failure". 
424  S 53(1)(c) sv "hazard". 
425  S 53(1)(b)(i). 
426  S 53(1)(c)(ii). 
427  Waite Little Oxford sv "significant": "adjective 1 a significant fact: notable, noteworthy, 
remarkable, important, of consequence. 2 a significant increase: large, considerable, sizeable, 
appreciable, conspicuous, obvious, sudden …".  
428  S 53(d) sv "unsafe". 
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regarded as the highest degree of risk, and definitely presents a higher risk than a 
"significant risk".429 It appears that the legislature intended to make provision for 
different degrees of risk in these definitions. 
 
3.8.2 The consumer's rights to demand quality service430 
 
The consumer has a right to demand quality service when a supplier undertakes to 
perform any services for or on his/her behalf. The right includes:431 
 
(a) punctual performance and completion of the services; timely notice of any 
unavoidable delay in performance (it is uncertain what would constitute "timely 
notice");432 
(b) that the services are performed in a manner and quality that persons (not merely 
consumers) are generally entitled to expect (again, the degree of performance 
that is required is a factual question);433 
(c) that, should any goods be required for the performance of the services, goods 
that are free of defects and of a quality that persons (not merely consumers) are 
generally entitled to expect (what kind of quality is this?) will be used, delivered 
or installed;434  
(d) the return of property (or control thereof) in at least the same condition as it was 
when the consumer made it available to the supplier to perform the services (it 
may be a difficult burden for the consumer to prove that the supplier returned the 
property in a worse condition than when it was made available to him/her).435 
 
In the instance in which a consumer's right (to demand) quality service is assessed, 
the circumstances of the supply and any specific criteria or conditions agreed on 
between the consumer and the supplier should be taken into account.436 Should a 
supplier infringe a consumer's right (to demand) quality service (for example, by 
                                                 
429  Waite Little Oxford sv "extreme": "adjective 1 extreme danger: utmost, (very) great, greatest 
(possible), maximum, great, acute, enormous, severe, serious". 
430  S 54. 
431  S 54(1). 
432  S 54(1)(a). 
433  S 54(1)(b). 
434  S 54(1)(c). 
435  S 54(1)(d). 
436  S 54(1). 
W JACOBS, PN STOOP & R VAN NIEKERK                      PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
366/508 
 
failing to perform a service to the standards as contemplated by Section 54(1)(a)–
(d)), the consumer may demand that the supplier:437 
 
(a) rectify any defect in the quality of the services rendered or the goods supplied;438 
or 
(b) reimburse the consumer with a reasonable portion of the price paid for the 
services rendered and goods supplied, having regard to the extent of the failure 
(it may be difficult to calculate the amount to be refunded to the consumer).439 
 
The consumer may choose a remedy. Unlike other sections of the Act,440 it does not 
appear that Section 54 limits the consumer to exercise his/her remedy within a 
specific period, and the normal period of prescription would apply. Was this an 
oversight, as it leaves room for much abuse by the consumer? 
 
3.8.3 The consumer's rights to safe, good quality goods441 
 
Goods bought at an auction are expressly excluded from the ambit of Section 55.442 
The consumer's right to safe quality goods includes the right to receive goods that:443 
 
(a) are reasonably suitable for the generally intended purposes;444 and 
(b) are of good quality,445 in working condition446 and free of any defects.447 (Note 
that this subsection pertains to any defect and not only to material ones.) 
                                                 
437  S 54(2). 
438  S 54(2)(a). 
439  S 54(2)(b). 
440  A consumer has to exercise his/her remedies under S 56 within six months after the delivery of 
the goods. See S 56(2); and the discussion of S 55(6) in 3.8.4 in the article.  
441  S 55. 
442  S 55(1). 
443  S 55(2). 
444  S 55(2)(a). See Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 205–215 for a summary on the seller's warranty of 
fitness for purpose under the common law; and Nagel et al Kommersiële Reg paras 14.65–
14.66. 
445  See Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 215–217 on the residual common-law warranty that goods sold 
are of a reasonable quality. Also see Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 218–219 on the manufacturer's 
and seller's warranty on the skill of their art. 
446 See Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 215–217 on the residual common-law warranty that goods sold 
are of a reasonable quality. Also see Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 218–219 on the manufacturer's 
and seller's warranty on the skill of their art. 
447  S 55(2)(b). See Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 219 on the seller's "implied warranty" against latent 
defects. Kerr is of the opinion that the warranty is residual and not implied, and that it is advisable 
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However, Section 55(6) provides that these requirements are not applicable to a 
transaction should the consumer: 
 
(a) have been expressly informed that particular goods were offered in a specific 
condition;448 and 
(b) have expressly agreed to accept the goods in that condition, or knowingly acted 
in a way compatible with accepting the goods in that condition.449 
 
This raises the question of what the impact of Section 55(6) on the effect of a 
voetstoots clause is. The position prior to the commencement of the Act may be 
summarised as follows. The seller's implied warranty against latent defects is 
one of the natural elements (naturale)450 of a contract of sale, and the seller 
(supplier) may be held liable for latent defects in goods sold with the actio 
redhibitoria or the actio quanti minoris.451 The implied warranty against latent 
defects can be expressly excluded by a voetstoots sale. The seller may rely on 
the voetstoots clause as a defence to relief claimed under the aedilian actions, 
unless he/she knew about the latent defect at the time of conclusion of the 
contract and concealed it dolo malo with the intention of defrauding the 
purchaser.452 Voetstoots clauses are often contained in contracts of sale and 
usually provide as follows: "The goods are sold voetstoots. The seller shall not 
be responsible for any defects latent or patent or any damage resulting 
therefrom and the purchaser agrees to accept the goods as they stand with all 
faults". 
                                                                                                                                                        
to rather speak of liability under the aediles edict than of a warranty. Also see Cornelius 
Principles 158 on the distinction between tacit and implied contract terms. 
448  S 55(6)(a). 
449  S 55(6)(b). 
450  Christie Law of Contract 159; and Nagel et al Kommersiële Reg para 14.49. 
451  See Harms Amler's Precedents 215–216 for a discussion on latent defects and the requirements 
to allege and prove the aedilian actions. The actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris are 
aedilian actions. With the actio redhibitoria, the purchaser may claim repayment of the purchase 
price and interest. With the actio quanti minoris, the purchaser is entitled to claim a price 
reduction, which is determined by the difference between the purchase price and the value of the 
goods with their defect. 
452  Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 2 SA 1 (A); Christie Law of Contract 295 n 141; Harms Amler's 
Precedents 215–216 and Lötz and Nagel Besondere Kontrakte in die Hof 40–50. Also note that 
fraud does not remove the voetstoots clause from the contract, and that the seller may rely on it 
to the extent that he/she acted honestly. See Trumen v Leonard 1994 4 SA 371 (SE); Harms 
Amler's Precedents 215–216; and Lötz and Nagel Besondere Kontrakte in die Hof 48–49. 
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The use of the voetstoots clause will be severely curbed after the commencement of 
the Act. Under the Act, the implied warranty against latent defects is only excluded if 
the requirements of Section 55(6) are met, namely should the seller (supplier) 
expressly inform the consumer of the specific condition of the goods and the 
consumer expressly agree to accept the goods in that condition, or knowingly act in 
a way compatible with accepting the goods in that condition (for example, by 
accepting and using the goods without complaining). 
 
The consumer's right to receive safe, good quality goods also includes the right to 
receive goods that:453 
 
(a) will be useable and durable for a reasonable time, taking into account their 
normal use and all the circumstances surrounding their supply;454 and 
(b) meet the mandatory standards of the Standards Act,455 or any other public 
regulation.456 
 
There is no doubt that these requirements are very widely worded. 
 
Further with reference to the consumer's right to receive goods that are reasonably 
suitable for the generally intended purposes,457 a consumer who has specifically 
informed the supplier of a particular purpose for which he/she wishes to acquire or 
use the goods has a right to expect that the goods are reasonably suitable for that 
particular purpose if the supplier:458 
 
(a) offers to supply such goods in its ordinary course of business;459 or 
(b) acts as if he/she is well informed about the use of the goods.460 
 
                                                 
453  S 55(2). 
454  S 55(2)(c). 
455  29 of 1993. 
456  S 55(2)(d). 
457  S 55(2)(a). 
458  S 55(3). 
459  S 55(3)(a). 
460  S 55(3)(b). 
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In order to determine whether specific goods satisfy the requirements of Sections 
55(2) and 55(3), all circumstances of the supply of the goods have to be 
considered.461 These circumstances include, but are not limited to: 
 
(a) the way in which and the purposes for which the goods were marketed, 
packaged and displayed; the use of trade descriptions or marks; any directions 
for or cautions with respect to the use of the goods;462  
(b) the scope of things that might reasonably be expected to be done with or in 
relation to the goods;463 and 
(c) the time of production and supply of the goods.464 
 
For the sake of more certainty in applying these criteria465 to determine whether 
goods satisfy the requirements of Sections 55(2) and 55(3), Section 55(5) provides 
that: 
 
(a) it may not be deduced that there is a product failure or defect solely on the 
grounds that more advanced goods have subsequently become available466 (at 
last a provision in favour of the supplier!); and 
(b) it is beside the point whether a product failure or defect was latent or patent, or 
whether the consumer could have detected the failure or defect prior to taking 
delivery of the goods.467 
 
The current position (the position before the commencement of the Act) is that a 
seller is deemed to have warranted to the purchaser that the goods are sold free 
from any defect that may render them completely or significantly unfit for their normal 
purpose, or should a specific purpose have been contemplated by the parties, for 
that purpose.468 However, should the purchaser have inspected the goods before 
delivery, the seller's warranty covers only latent defects.469  
                                                 
461  S 55(4). 
462  S 55(4)(a). 
463  S 55(4)(b). 
464  S 55(4)(c). 
465  S 55(4). 
466  S 55(4)(b). 
467  S 55(5)(a). 
468  De Beer Butterworths Forms and Precedents Commercial Transactions 2 610–611. Also see SA 
Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v Park Rynie Whaling Co Ltd 1916 AD 400 para 413; Naude v Harrison 
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Under the Act, it becomes irrelevant whether a defect is patent or latent or whether 
the consumer could have detected the failure or defect prior to taking delivery of the 
goods. What would the position be should the consumer have indeed examined the 
goods and detected the defect prior to delivery, but still accepted delivery? Would 
such a consumer still be entitled to rely on the remedies in Section 56? The authors 
assume so (except in so far as Section 55(6) applies),470 as the wider interpretation 
gives more protection to the consumer. 
 
Section 56(1) confirms the existence of an implied warranty that goods that are 
supplied comply with the standards and requirements contemplated in Section 55. A 
question that arises is whether Section 55 has any force without, and independent 
of, Section 56.471 
 
3.8.4 The implied warranty of quality472 
 
Section 56 poses many interpretational problems and is one of the most 
controversial sections in the Act in view of its potential extensive impact on the 
common law.  
 
Section 56(1) provides that there is an implied warranty in every transaction or 
agreement pertaining to the supply of goods to a consumer, and that the producer473 
or importer,474 the distributor475 and the retailer476 each warrants that the goods 
comply with the requirements and the standards contemplated in Section 55. This is 
                                                                                                                                                        
1925 CPD 84; Young's Provision Stores (Pty) Ltd v Van Ryneveld 1936 CPD 87 para 91; Dibley 
v Furter 1951 4 SA 73 (C). Also see Kerr Law of Sale and Lease 205–211; and Nagel et al 
Kommersiële Reg para 14.65 on the warranty of fitness for purpose. 
469  De Beer Butterworths Forms and Precedents Commercial Transactions 611. 
470  See the discussion of S 55(6) in 3.8.3 in the article. 
471  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 424, in which they comment on S 61 of the Draft Consumer 
Protection Bill of 2006 (one of the predecessors of S 55, although not identical). They are of the 
opinion that S 61 of the Bill (not the Act) set out contractual rights between suppliers and 
consumers, rather than created general rules for strict liability outside a contractual relationship. 
S 61 on product liability again does not require a contractual nexus between the supplier and the 
consumer. See the discussion of S 61 in 3.8.9 in the article. 
472  Ss 55(2)–55(3). 
473  S 1 sv "producer" and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
474  S 1 sv "importer" and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
475  S 1 sv "distributor" and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
476  S 1 sv "retailer". 
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the position except when the goods have been changed contrary to the instructions, 
or after leaving the control of the producer, importer, distributor or retailer involved.  
 
Cross-references to Section 55 make Section 56 difficult to comprehend. Section 55 
must be read with Section 56. As has been said,477 the standards and requirements 
contemplated in Section 55 cover a broader spectrum than the quality of the goods. 
These standards and requirements also pertain to the safety of the goods and their 
suitability for the purposes they are generally intended for or the specific purpose 
that the customer has indicated.  
 
On the one hand, the implied warranty under Section 56(1) is more comprehensive 
than the title of Section 56 suggests and more extensive than the implied warranties 
under the common law.478 The implied warranty under Section 56(1) is extended to 
the producer or importer and the distributor and the retailer,479 but requires that a 
transaction480 or an agreement481 pertaining to the supply of goods should exist. The 
inconsistent use of terminology in Section 56 is another contributing factor to the 
many interpretational problems of Section 56. Section 56(1) refers to specific terms 
"producer", "importer", "distributor" and "retailer" (who are suppliers in the supply 
chain)482 instead of the general term "supplier" that is used in the remainder of 
Sections 56(2) and 56(3) and in the majority of the other sections in the Act. What is 
                                                 
477  See 2.5 in the article. 
478  The implied warranties under common law referred to here are the implied warranty against 
latent defects, the warranty of fitness for purpose, the warranty of reasonable merchantable 
quality and the warranty of the skill of art.  
479  S 56(1). Note the use of "or" between producer and importer. The implied warranty is given by 
either the producer or the importer, and by the distributor and the retailer. The implied warranty 
cannot pertain to the producer and importer simultaneously. See S 1 sv "producer" and 
"importer"; and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. A producer may, for 
instance, produce the goods within South Africa (but he, she or it does not necessarily need to 
reside or have his, her or its principle office in South Africa). Alternatively, an importer may bring 
goods from outside the Republic of South Africa into the Republic. There would either be an 
importer or a producer in a particular supply chain and that explains the use of the word "or" in S 
56(1) between producer and importer. The same explanation applies to S 61. Note that the Act 
applies to every transaction inside the Republic of South Africa (save for the exempted 
transactions in S 5) and that it is irrelevant whether the supplier resides or has his, her or its 
principle office outside the Republic of South Africa. This is another example of how extensive 
the application is.  
480  S 1 sv "transaction"; and see the discussion of the application of the Act and the definitions in the 
Act in 2.4–2.6 in the article. 
481  S 1 sv "agreement"; and see the discussion of the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
482  S 1 sv "supply chain"; and see the discussion of the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
Note that service providers (although members of the supply chain) have been omitted from S 
56(1), as S 56 deals with the supply of goods, not services.  
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the reason for and practical implications of the use of these specific terms for each 
type of supplier? It is the authors' opinion that the implied warranty may, for example, 
apply respectively between the retailer, the distributor, the producer or importer and 
the consumer. Furthermore, the implied warranty may, for example, apply between 
the distributor (as supplier) and retailer (as consumer); between the distributor (as 
supplier) and another distributor (as consumer); and between the importer or 
producer (as supplier) and the distributor (as consumer); and even between the 
importer or producer (as supplier) and the retailer (as consumer), so long as the 
transactions are not exempted from the Act under Section 5.483 
 
On the other hand, the warranty under Section 56(1) is curbed by the limitation in 
Section 55(6). Should the supplier have expressly informed the consumer of the 
specific condition of the goods, and should the consumer have expressly agreed to 
accept the goods in that condition, or knowingly acted in a way compatible with 
accepting the goods in that condition, the implied warranty of quality may (depending 
on the facts), for example, not include that the goods are reasonably suitable for the 
generally intended purposes, or the warranty may not include that the goods are of 
good quality, in working condition and free of any defects.  
 
Should the goods fail to comply with the standards and the requirements 
contemplated in Section 55, the consumer may return the goods to the supplier 
without penalty and at the supplier's risk within six months after the delivery of the 
goods.484 This subsection may have huge cost implications for the supplier. The 
consumer has a choice to claim that the supplier must either repair or replace the 
failed, unsafe or defective goods485 or refund the consumer the price paid for the 
goods.486 Does the six-month period set in Section 56(2) limit the implied warranty of 
goods under Section 56(1) of the Act itself to six months, or does the reference to six 
months only limit the consumer to exercise his/her remedies under Section 56(2) 
within a time period of six months?  
 
                                                 
483  For a discussion of the exemptions from the Act, see 2.5 in the article.  
484  S 56(2). 
485  S 56(2)(a). 
486  S 56(2)(b). 
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Under the former interpretation, the implied warranty of quality will be limited to a 
period of six months after delivery of the goods. The consumer's remedies under 
Section 56(2) would furthermore have to be enforced within six months after delivery 
of the goods. It may entail that a supplier is prohibited from selling goods voetstoots 
for the first period of six months, but that voetstoots may apply thereafter.487 How 
would it work in practice?  
 
Under the latter interpretation, the consumer's remedies under Section 56(2) would 
still have to be enforced within six months after delivery of the goods, but the implied 
warranty of good quality will exist indefinitely, and the consumer would be able to 
rely on his/her common-law rights to claim damages where breach of the implied 
warranty of quality occurred six months or longer after the delivery of the goods. The 
normal period of prescription for the institution of a claim for damages would apply. It 
is the authors' opinion that the latter interpretation would be followed, as it provides 
better protection to the consumer. Section 56(1) does not impose a time limit on the 
implied warranty of good quality, and neither does Section 55 (which sets out the 
consumer's right to safe, good quality goods) contain time limitations. As with other 
sections of the Act, Section 56(2) and its possible wide interpretation leaves room for 
much abuse by the consumer to the detriment of the supplier. 
 
Should the supplier repair goods or any component thereof in terms of Section 
56(2)(a), and within three months after the (attempted) repair the failure, defect or 
unsafe feature has not been remedied, or another failure, defect or unsafe feature 
turns up (presumably also within three months after the repair of the first failure, 
defect or unsafe feature), the supplier is obliged to either replace the goods488 or 
refund the consumer the price paid for the goods.489 Whereas Section 56(2) clearly 
states that the remedies provided for in that section are at the discretion of the 
consumer, Section 56(3) does not contain a similar provision.490 It is proposed that 
the remedies contained in Section 56(3) are also available at the discretion of the 
                                                 
487  Note that the consumer rights that are created under the Act apply in addition to any common-
law rights that the consumer may have. Also see S 56(4) and the discussion of S 56(4) in 3.8.4 in 
the article. 
488  See S 56(3)(a). 
489  See S 56(3)(b). 
490  See Ss 56(2)–56(3). 
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consumer and that the consumer has a choice of the remedy on which he/she 
wishes to rely. 
 
Section 56(4) confirms that the implied warranty in respect of quality under Section 
56(1) and the right to return goods under Section 56(2) exist in addition to: 
 
(a) any other implied warranty or condition imposed by the common law, the Act or 
any other public regulation;491 and 
(b) any express warranty or condition provided by the producer or importer, the 
distributor or the retailer.492 
 
Section 56(4)(b) does, for example, not refer to tacit warranties or conditions by the 
supplier, and this omission by the legislature may be an oversight, as tacit and 
implied terms are sometimes confused.493 
 
The legal fraternity has raised concerns over the possible application of Section 56 
to the sale of land and immovable property.494 Whereas voetstoots clauses have 
been used extensively in contracts of sale of land and immovable property prior to 
the commencement of the Act, voetstoots clauses might not be effective after the 
commencement of the Act. If immovable property is, for example, sold with a defect 
such as a leaking roof, the consumer may exercise the remedy of his/her choice 
under Section 55(2). Repair of the roof (if possible) does not pose a problem, but 
replacement or a refund does, as ownership of the immovable property may already 
have passed to the consumer by registration of the title deed in the consumer's 
name in a deeds office. Such a transaction cannot be undone readily or without a 
huge cost implication (to the supplier). And what is to be done should the supplier 
have already purchased a new home on which a bond has been registered and the 
previous transaction has to be reversed? 
 
                                                 
491  See S 56(4)(a). 
492  See S 56(4)(b). 
493  Again, see Cornelius Principles 158 on the distinction between tacit and implied contract terms. 
494  Campbell "Consumer Protection Bill". 
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Whether the implied warranty of quality applies to the sale of land and immovable 
property may largely depend on an interpretation of the definitions of "goods",495 
"retailer",496 "transaction"497 and "agreement".498 It is relevant that the definition of 
"goods" includes "a legal interest in land or any other immovable property, other than 
an interest that falls within the definition of "service"499 in Section 1. It appears that 
the consumer's (buyer's) legal interest in the immovable property may be regarded 
as goods. The definition of "retailer" poses more uncertainty and may be a possible 
hurdle for the implied warranty to be applicable to once-off transactions. Section 1 
defines a "retailer" as a person who supplies particular goods to a consumer in the 
ordinary course of business. What does "ordinary course of business" mean? Can it 
be said that a private seller of a home sells it in the ordinary course of his/her 
business, and that such a seller is therefore a "retailer" for purposes of that 
agreement? Or does "ordinary course of business" require the seller to be in the 
business of selling homes, for example, a developer, before he/she will qualify as a 
retailer, if at all? Section 56(1) pertains to both transactions and agreements.500 A 
"transaction" is required to be entered into in the ordinary course of business, but 
ordinary course of business is not a requirement of an "agreement". The courts or 
the legislature would have to clarify whether Section 56 also applies to immovable 
property.  
 
Should the implied warranty of quality apply to the sale of land and immovable 
property, it is important to remember that it would not apply to any transaction in 
terms of which the consumer is a juristic person501 whose asset value or annual 
turnover, at the time of the transaction, equals or exceeds the threshold value 
determined by the Minister in terms of Section 6 of the Act.502 Consumers who buy 
land or immovable property in the names of juristic persons may be denied the 
                                                 
495  S 1 sv "goods"; and see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
496  S 1 sv "retailer"; and see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
497  S 1 sv "transaction"; and see the discussion of the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
498  S 1 sv "agreement"; and see the discussion of the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
499  S 1 sv "service". The interest that falls within the definition of service refers to "a right of 
occupancy of, or power or privilege over or in connection with, any land or immovable property, 
other than in terms of a rental; and ...". 
500  Is it significant that the Act applies to transactions only? See S 5; and the discussion on the 
application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
501  S 1 sv "juristic person"; and see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
502  S 5(2)(d); and see the discussion of the application of the Act in 2.5 in the article. 
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protection of the Act should the transaction be exempted from the Act in terms of 
Section 5(2)(d). 
 
3.8.5 The warranty on repaired goods503 
 
Section 57(1) provides that a service provider504 warrants new or reconditioned parts 
installed during repair or servicing, as well as the labour to install the part(s), for 
three months, calculated from the date of installation, or for a longer period, as the 
supplier may stipulate in writing.  
 
Section 57(2) confirms that the warranty on repaired goods: 
 
(a) is concurrent with any other deemed, implied or express warranty;505 (It is 
uncertain what the legislature meant by a "deemed" warranty? What is the 
difference between a deemed and an implied warranty, if any? Like Section 
56(4), this subsection also does not refer to tacit warranties. Is this another 
omission or an instance in which implied and tacit terms are incorrectly 
equated?)506 
(b) is void should the consumer have subjected the part, or the goods or property in 
which it was installed, to misuse or abuse;507 (This is one of the few express 
provisions in the Act in favour of suppliers. The use of the word "property" is 
peculiar and superfluous here, as the word "goods" is used throughout the Act 
and the definition of "goods" also includes a legal interest in land or immovable 
property.)508 
(c) does not apply to ordinary wear and tear of the parts, having regard to the 
intended circumstances in which the goods are generally to be used.509 
                                                 
503  S 57. 
504  S 1 sv "service provider"; and see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
505  S 57(2)(a). 
506  See the discussion on S 56(4) in 3.8.4 in the article. Again, see Cornelius Principles 158 on the 
distinction between tacit and implied contract terms. 
507  S 57(2)(b). 
508  S 1 sv "goods" and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
509  S 57(2)(c). 
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3.8.6 The warning concerning fact and nature of risks510  
 
Section 58 addresses hazardous511 and unsafe512 goods or services and has a wide 
application. Section 58(1) provides that the supplier of any activity or facility513 that is 
subject to: (a) risk of uncommon character or nature;514 (b) risk of which the 
consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware; or which an ordinarily 
attentive consumer could not reasonably be expected to foresee;515 or (c) risk that 
may lead to serious injury or death516 must specifically forewarn the consumer of the 
fact, nature and potential effect of that risk. The manner and form of the notice must 
meet the standards set out in Section 49.517  
 
The notice must be given at the earliest of the following times: prior to entering into 
the agreement or transaction; prior to the consumer entering into the facility or 
engaging in the activity; or prior to the consumer tendering consideration. The notice 
must comply with the requirements of Section 22518 in respect of information in plain 
and understandable language to enable an ordinary consumer with average literacy 
skills and minimum consumer experience to understand the notice.519 Although no 
specific languages are prescribed for the notice,520 warnings in foreign languages on 
imported goods will have to be translated into English or the dominant language(s) of 
the region for which the goods are intended. The question arises whether suppliers 
would also have to translate the warnings on locally produced goods to cater for 
foreign residents in South Africa.521 The costs involved in translating and re-writing 
warnings would be significant. As the Act only applies to transactions within the 
Republic of South Africa, suppliers of locally produced goods would not have to 
                                                 
510  S 58 
511  S 53(1)(c) sv "hazard"; and see the discussion in 3.8.1 in the article. 
512  S 53(1)(d) sv "unsafe"; and see the discussion in 3.8.2 in the article. 
513  S 1 sv "facility": a facility "means any premises, space or equipment set up to fulfil a particular 
function, or at, in, or on which a particular service is available". 
514  S 58(1)(a). 
515  S 58(1)(b). 
516  S 58(1)(c). 
517  Ss 49 and 58(1); and see the discussions in 3.7.2 and 3.8.6 in the article. 
518  See the discussion of S 22 in 3.4.1 in the article. 
519  Also see S 24 on product labelling and trade description that may be relevant here. 
520  In contrast to the Act, the National Credit Act prescribes official language requirements in S 63. 
The omission of official language requirements may be a possible shortcoming in the Act. 
521  See Narsigan Business Brief 13. 
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translate and re-write warnings for foreign consumers overseas under the Act, but 
they may be subject to foreign consumer protection legislation in the countries to 
which their goods are exported.  
 
The notice required under Section 58(1), read with Section 49, must be conspicuous 
so that it would be likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily attentive customer.522 
The consumer must be given a reasonable opportunity to receive and comprehend 
the notice,523 and must assent to the notice by signature, initialling or by otherwise 
acting in a manner that acknowledges receipt of the notice, awareness of the risk 
and acceptance of the risk.524  
 
Adventure activities, such as cage diving and bungee jumping, and facilities, such as 
gyms, shooting ranges or theme parks, will definitely fall under Section 58(1) 
because the risk can result in serious injury or death. Compliance with and 
monitoring of Section 58 would be very time-consuming and place a heavy burden 
on suppliers.525 Take a pharmacy, for example, in which all of the above provisions 
might have to be complied with before a sick (and perhaps hurried patient) may 
receive his/her medicine. Further, how would Section 58(1) be complied with before 
an emergency operation? The subsection does not provide exemption from 
compliance with the provisions in emergency situations, but the common-law 
defence of necessity may be invoked by a supplier. It would have far-reaching 
implications should Section 58 also apply to health professionals and hospitals. 
 
A packager of hazardous or unsafe goods must display a notice on or with the 
packaging that provides the consumer with adequate instructions for the safe 
handling and use of the goods.526 The packager of goods (who may actually be a 
person other than the supplier of the goods) bears this very onerous duty. Why is the 
                                                 
522  S 49(4)(a). 
523  S 49(5). 
524  S 49(2). 
525  See Narsigan Business Brief 13 in which she gives the example of a cashier who has to explain 
the potential hazard of items in a trolley full of groceries to the consumer. The cashier may, for 
example, have to do that in relation to all goods that contain nuts, as nuts may be hazardous or 
unsafe goods because they could cause serious injury or death to consumers who are allergic to 
nuts. This would require more and better-trained staff, as well as extensive liability insurance for 
the supplier (and his, her or its employees). 
526  S 58(2). 
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duty to provide the customer with adequate instructions not placed directly on the 
producer or importer, the distributor and the retailer and the person who installs 
hazardous or unsafe goods (all the members of the supply chain) under Section 
58(2)? This may again be an oversight as all the members of the supply chain may 
be held jointly and severally liable under Section 61 of the Act for any harm caused 
as a consequence of inadequate instructions or warnings to the consumer in respect 
of hazardous goods.527 The duty to inform the consumer of hazardous (and unsafe 
goods)528 thus applies to all members of the supply chain, as well as to packagers of 
hazardous or unsafe goods. The notice under Section 58(2) must comply with the 
requirements of Section 22 on information in plain and understandable language, as 
well as with any other applicable standards. What will be regarded as "other 
applicable standards"? "Other applicable standards" is a very vague term, but may, 
for example, refer to Section 24 on product labelling and trade descriptions.529 
 
Section 58(3) provides that Section 58(2) does not apply should a largely similar 
label or notice have been applied in terms of any other regulation. Medicine issued 
with patient information leaflets (more readily understandable than ordinary 
pharmaceutical leaflets) may be one such example in which the packager does not 
bear the onus to display adequate instructions on or in the packaging.530 
 
A service provider that installs hazardous or unsafe goods for a consumer, or 
supplies any such goods to a consumer in addition to performing any services, must 
supply the consumer with the original copies of: 
 
(a) documents that provide the consumer with adequate instructions for the safe 
handling and use of those goods;531 or 
(b) any similar documents applied to those goods under another public regulation.532 
                                                 
527  See Ss 61(1)(a), 61(2), 61(3) and 61(5) on the liability for damage caused by goods. 
528  S 61 provides that the producer or importer, distributor or retailer of goods may be held jointly 
and severally liable for any harm caused as a consequence of inadequate instructions or 
warnings provided to the consumer pertaining to any hazard arising from or associated with the 
use of any goods. It does not expressly mention unsafe goods. See S 53(1)(c) sv "hazard"; see S 
53(1)(d) sv "unsafe"; and see the discussion in 3.8.1 in the article. 
529  See again the discussion on the consumer's right to information in plain and understandable 
language in 3.4.1 in the article; and, as regards S 58(2), see the discussion in 3.8.6 in the article. 
Also see Narsigan Witness Weekend 19 for some examples on the effect of S 58(2).  
530  S 58(3). 
531  Ss 58(2) and 58(4)(a). 
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Suppliers would have to train their staff to comply with the extensive provisions of the 
Act. A service provider who installs hazardous or unsafe goods will have to train its 
employees to abide by the provisions of Section 58(4).533 Its administrative 
procedures (for example, ensuring that it has the required documentation at hand 
and at the installation site at the time of installation) will have to be streamlined. The 
implementation costs of the Act for suppliers may be huge, and it is presumed that 
the costs would eventually be filtered back to the consumer.534  
 
3.8.7 The recovery and safe disposal of designated products or components 
 
Section 59(1)(a) provides that the person who, in the ordinary course of business, 
supplies designated products (products prohibited from being disposed or deposited 
in a common waste system by national legislation) to consumers must accept the 
return of any such goods, components, remnants, containers or packaging from the 
consumer without any charge, irrespective of whether that person supplied those 
particular objects to the consumer. Section 59(1)(a) provides that the producer, 
importer or distributor of any such goods must again receive the same from the 
person contemplated in Section 58(1)(b). This subsection does not provide that the 
producer, importer or distributor may not levy a charge for the disposal on behalf of 
the retailer. 
 
Alternatively, the consumer may dispose of or deposit designated products at a 
collection facility provided for in any regulation or waste management plan.535 
 
Products to be disposed of safely by the consumer may, for example, include the 
return of used injection needles to a pharmacy or the remainder of poisonous 
pesticide to a nursery or hardware store. Again, the suppliers have to carry the costs 
of the safe disposal of the designated products. It seems reasonable that they should 
bear the onus of disposing of the product, as they should be more competent to do 
                                                                                                                                                        
532  S 58(4)(b). 
533  See Pile Financial Mail 114. 
534  Maphosa 2009 Without Prejudice 36–37. 
535  S 59(2). 
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so than a consumer. That suppliers must bear the costs of the safe disposal alone is, 
however, questionable. 
 
3.8.8 Safety monitoring and recall536 
 
Section 60(1) provides that the Commission must promote industry-wide codes537 of 
practice within the framework of Section 82 to sustain systems to receive notice of 
product failures,538 monitor the sources of such information,539 carry out 
investigations,540 notify consumers of risks,541 and recall goods.542 The Commission 
may, by written notice, require that a producer must: (a) conduct an investigation;543 
or (b) carry out a recall programme on the Commission's terms544 should there be 
reasonable grounds to suggest that goods may be unsafe, or should there be a 
potential of risk to the public from the continued use of or exposure to the goods, and 
the producer or the importer of those goods has not taken the steps required by its 
industry code under Section 60(1).545 
 
Section 60(3) provides that a producer or importer who is prejudiced by a notice to 
investigate or recall goods under Section 60(2) may apply to the Tribunal to set the 
notice aside completely or partially. This subsection provides no right to appeal for a 
retailer or a distributor who may be affected by a notice to a producer to investigate 
or recall goods. This may be the case because they should be able to claim their 
damages and expenses as result of investigation or recall from the producer. It is 
uncertain why Section 60(3) provides the right to appeal to the importer as well, 
                                                 
536  S 60. 
537  S 82 sv "industry code". 
538  S 60(1)(a)(i)–(iv). Systems should be sustained to receive notice of: consumer complaints or 
reports of product failures, defects or hazards; the return of goods due to a failure, defect or 
hazard; personal injury, illness or damage to property as a result of a product failure, defect or 
hazard; and other indications of failure, defect or hazard. 
539  S 60(1)(b) provides that systems should be sustained to monitor the sources of the information in 
S 60(1)(a) and analyse that information to detect or identify previously undetected or 
unrecognised potential risk to the public by the use of or exposure to those goods. 
540  S 60(1)(c). Systems should also be sustained to carry out investigations into the nature, causes, 
extent and degree of the risk to the public. 
541  S 60(1)(d). Systems should further be sustained to notify consumers of the risk as contemplated 
in S 60(1)(c). 
542  S 60(1)(e). Systems should lastly be sustained to recall goods that are unsafe for repair, 
replacement or refund.  
543  S 60(2)(a). 
544  S 60(2)(b). 
545  S 60(2). 
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because the producer (not the importer) is the member of the supply team who may 
be tasked with the investigation or recall programme under Section 60(2), and the 
importer should also be able to claim his, her or its damages and expenses from the 
producer. The buck stops at the producer of the goods. 
 
3.8.9 Liability for damage caused by goods: "Manufacturers'" or "products 
liability"546 
 
Section 61 deals with so-called "manufacturers'" or "product liability". It is one of the 
(if not the) most controversial sections547 of the Act, as it appears to introduce no-
fault or strict product liability.548 
 
Prior to the commencement of the Act, manufacturers' liability could be established 
either under the law of contract or under the law of delict.549 Contractual liability 
requires a contractual nexus between the supplier of the defective product and the 
party suffering the harm as a result of the defect.550 There is seldom a contractual 
nexus between the producer (manufacturer) of the product and the consumer (as 
retail client). Apart from his/her contractual remedies against the retailer (the seller), 
the consumer may find recourse under the law of delict. All the elements of a delict 
have to be proven to establish the manufacturers' liability under the law of delict.551 
In general, it is very difficult for a consumer to prove fault on the part of the producer, 
because there may, for instance, not be fault present in the production process, or 
the consumer could obtain proof of fault because he/she does not have insight into 
                                                 
546  S 61. 
547  Owing to the many controversies regarding S 61 and space constraints, it is not possible to 
provide a comprehensive critique on this section. The authors provide a number of comments 
that they consider to be particularly relevant. Many other aspects and details of S 61 and product 
liability remain to be explored. 
548  Dinnie Financial Mail; Maphosa 2009 Without Prejudice 36–37; Dinnie Healthcare Review 59–60; 
Donneley Mail & Guardian 15; Narsigan 2009 http://bit.ly/eDy9QU; Dinnie 2009 HASA 8–9; 
Dinnie 2009 http://bit.ly/fm2fPi; Du Preez 2009 TSAR 79; Reed 2008 http://bit.ly/enAgHr; Dinnie 
2007 http://bit.ly/gdrzfu; Maphosa 2009 http://bit.ly/i92Mhx; and Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 
412. 
549  Weston 2007 http://bit.ly/i7ZbJ2. 
550  Weston 2007 http://bit.ly/i7ZbJ2. A seller of goods is strictly liable for any consequential damage 
caused by a latent defect in a case in which the seller publicly professes to have attributes of skill 
and expert knowledge relating to that type of goods, even should the seller have been unaware 
of the defect. Also see Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 
670 (A). 
551  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 292. 
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the production process552 or is unable to identify the producer.553 In Wagener v 
Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd,554 the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
not prepared to recognise strict product liability, and confirmed the fault requirement 
for product liability.555 The court concluded that in cases in which strict product 
liability is to be imposed,556 it is a task for the legislature.557 
 
Section 61558 now provides that the producer or importer, distributor or retailer of 
goods is liable for harm caused because of:  
 
(a) the supply of unsafe goods;559  
(b) a product failure, defect or hazard in goods;560 or 
(c) insufficient instructions or warnings to the consumer pertaining to any hazard 
arising from or associated with the use of goods.561 
 
Negligence is not required to establish liability on the part of the producer, importer, 
distributor or retailer, as the case may be.562  
 
Strict product liability applies to any producer, distributor, importer or retailer. The 
legislature failed to use the generic word "supplier" here.563 Section 61(3) imposes 
                                                 
552  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 294. 
553  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 431. 
554  2003 4 SA 285 (SCA) – hereafter Wagener. 
555  See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 329–330 on the justification for liability without 
fault; Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 415–423 on the policy considerations underlying strict 
liability and the appropriateness of reform of the existing structure of the law; and Weston 2007 
http://bit.ly/i7ZbJ2 on the reasons for strict liability. 
556  For a summary of the comprehensive objectives in respect of strict product liability as envisaged 
by the court (Wagener paras 298–300), see Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 415.  
557  See 300G–H/I. See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 392–336 on the forms of 
liability without fault recognised by our law of delict. 
558  See Maphosa 2009 Without Prejudice, in which he distinguishes between three major types of 
liability claims that suppliers may face, namely manufacturing defects, design defects and failure 
to warn of defects under the Act. Manufacturing defects mostly occur due to inadequate quality 
control, substandard quality materials and deficient workmanship. Design defects may render 
goods dangerous or ineffective. Failure to warn of defects relates to Ss 22, 24 and 58. See again 
the discussions in 3.4.1, 3.4.3 and 3.8.6 in the article. 
559  S 61(1)(a). Also see S 53(1)(d) sv "unsafe". 
560  S 61(1)(b). Also see S 53(1)(a)–(c) sv "defect", "failure" and "hazard". 
561  S 61(1)(c). Also see S 22 on the consumer's right to information in plain and understandable 
language, S 24 on product labelling and trade description, S 58 on warnings concerning fact, and 
nature of risks and the discussions in 3.4.3 and 3.8.6 in the article. 
562  S 61(1). 
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joint and several liability on all the persons who may be liable in terms of Section 
61.564 There would either be a producer or an importer of particular goods, but it is 
not clear why the legislature used the word "or" between distributor and retailer, as 
they may both be involved in the same supply chain, and they may both be liable to 
the customer at the same time. 
 
Section 61(2) provides that a supplier of services, who in conjunction with performing 
the services, applies, supplies, installs or provides access to any goods, is regarded 
as a supplier of those goods to the consumer for the purposes of Section 61. This 
subsection attempts to impose strict product liability on, for example, an electrician 
who installs a defective geyser. It may also, for example, impose strict liability on a 
surgeon who implants a defective pacemaker or a defective prosthetic.565 The 
purpose of Section 61(2) is to protect customers against defective and inferior goods 
installed by suppliers, as they often do not have a choice from amongst goods and 
have to rely on the supplier's choices. However, owing to the omission of the word 
"supplier" in Section 61(1), an amendment may be necessary before strict product 
liability as contemplated in Section 61(2) may be imposed on service providers. It 
does not appear that Section 61(1) extends to service providers because it only 
refers to producers, importers, distributors and retailers. Alternatively, the legislature 
may have intended that service providers should be treated as retailers566 under 
Section 61(1).567 If so, why was this not clearly stipulated? 
 
Not only consumers, but all injured persons may claim under Section 61. Should the 
defective geyser, in the example supra, burst and cause damage to the consumer's 
home and belongings, the consumer may claim. Should the consumer have 
happened to have guests and they sustained water damage to, for example, their 
luggage, they may also claim under Section 61. Small businesses, including juristic 
                                                                                                                                                        
563  The word "supplier" was used in S 71(1) on product liability in the Draft Consumer Protection Bill 
of 2006: see Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 431–432. Also see their discussion on who is liable 
under the strict product liability provisions in the UK and Europe. 
564  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 432–433, in which they allude to the position of joint and 
several liability of participants in the retail chain in other jurisdictions. 
565  Dinnie Healthcare Review 59–60; and Dinnie 2009 http://bit.ly/fm2fPi. 
566  See again S 1 sv "retailer"; and the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
567  Dinnie 2009 http://bit.ly/fm2fPi. 
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persons that are not exempted from the Act under Section 5, may also rely on 
Section 61.568  
 
In most jurisdictions, product liability is regarded as a sub-area of the law of delict.569 
In order to be successful in his/her product liability claim, a plaintiff will have to prove 
that (a) goods that are (b) unsafe, defective, or have failed or are hazardous, or 
contained inadequate instructions pertaining to a hazard (c) caused (d) harm (e) 
wrongfully.570 
 
A few comments are necessary in respect of goods to clarify the application of 
Section 61 to certain kinds of goods. Section 61 would apply to land and buildings.571 
Structural or design defects that render buildings unsafe, and hazards on land sold 
may result in huge strict liability claims.572 Section 61 would also apply to information 
itself (for example, a recipe in a cookbook that contains poisonous herbs or plants as 
ingredients)573 and to the medium on which information is written (for example, the 
defective software that causes a computer to malfunction). Some suppliers produce 
inherently dangerous products. An example would be the South African National 
Blood Service that supplies blood or blood products. The blood may, for instance, be 
contaminated by HIV. Blood and blood products should fall under the definition of 
goods574 and are not exempted from strict product liability.575 Pharmaceuticals, which 
are by nature hardly ever completely safe, are also subject to strict product liability, 
                                                 
568  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 431–432, in which they explain that A 9 in the European 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC OJ 1985 L210 relates only to goods of a type ordinarily intended 
for private use or consumption and used by the harmed person mainly for private use or 
consumption. S 61 applies to a wider category of goods. 
569  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 414. 
570  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 418. 
571  S 1 sv "goods" that include an interest in land or in other immovable property. 
572  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 433 referring to A 2 in the European Council Directive 
85/374/EEC OJ 1985 L210, which includes only movable property. S 61 applies to a wider 
category of goods. 
573  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 433–434 for a critical discussion on strict liability relating to 
information. Also see S 1 sv "goods" that include "any medium on which anything is written or 
encoded; … information …". 
574  S 1 sv "goods"; and see the discussion of the definitions in the Act in 2.6 in the article. 
575  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 434–435 for a critical discussion of strict product liability 
and blood or blood products. Loubser and Reid also refer to the position under other jurisdictions. 
In some of these jurisdictions, blood and blood products are excluded from strict product liability. 
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despite the problems that may occur when establishing causation.576 The definition 
of goods does not provide directly for components, although they may be included 
under "any tangible object".577 Section 61(1) provides for strict product liability 
caused wholly or partly as a consequence of, for example, a defect. The definition of 
a defect578 provides for components of goods. The supplier of a defective component 
(for example, the brakes of a truck) that caused a complex product (for example, a 
truck) to fail, is liable, as is the supplier of the complex product. This is another 
example of the very wide application of the Act.579  
 
Unsafe, defective, failed or hazardous goods and inadequate instructions pertaining 
to a hazard have already been discussed.580 As regards causation, the plaintiff 
carries the burden to prove a material factual link between the product defect or the 
inadequate instructions and the harm suffered.581 
 
Harm for which a person may be held liable under Section 61 includes:582 
 
(a) death or injury of a natural person;583 
(b) illness of a natural person;584 
(c) loss or physical damage to any property (movable or immovable);585 and 
(d) any economic loss that results from the harm contemplated above (for example, 
should a small business be the consumer, it may claim for loss of profit; a natural 
person may claim for loss of earnings).586 
 
                                                 
576  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 437–438 on the manner in which other jurisdictions provide for 
strict product liability and pharmaceuticals, and 440–446 on causation. Also see Dinnie 2009 
http://bit.ly/fm2fPi. 
577  S 1 sv "goods". 
578  S 53(1)(a)(i)–(ii) sv "defect". 
579  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 438–439 on strict product liability and defective 
components. 
580  See the discussions in 3.8.1 and 3.8.6 in the article. 
581  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 440–446 on causation in the realm of strict product liability. 
In this regard, especially note the complexities relating to manufacturing defects, defects giving 
rise to non-traumatic injury, and warnings issued with products. 
582  S 61(5). 
583  S 61(5)(a). 
584  S 61(5)(b). 
585  S 61(5)(c). 
586  S 61(5)(d). See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 439–440 on the damages that may be 
compensated. 
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Section 61 provides more extensive compensation than the consumer would have 
been able to claim from a retailer under the law of contract. 
 
As regards wrongfulness, the plaintiff also carries the burden to prove wrongfulness 
(with the defectiveness of the product playing an important part).587 
 
Section 61(4) provides a number of defences against liability for damage caused by 
goods: 
 
(a) if the unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard causes harm that is 
wholly attributable to compliance with any public regulation;588 
(b) if the alleged unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard:589 
(i) did not exist in the goods when the goods were supplied by that person to 
another person, alleged to be liable; (this appears to be a defence that will 
often be raised by suppliers)"590 or 
(ii) was wholly attributable to compliance by that person (which appears to refer 
to the consumer) with instructions provided by the person who supplied the 
goods (for example, where a biltong slicer in good working condition was 
supplied with clear instructions for use, but was not used accordingly by the 
consumer).591  
(c) if it is unreasonable to expect that the distributor or retailer should have detected 
the unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, with regard to their 
role in marketing the goods to consumers;592 or 
(d) if the claim for damages is brought more than three years after the: 
(i) death or injury of any natural person harmed or injured as a consequence of 
the goods or inadequate instructions or warnings;593 
                                                 
587  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 418–423 on wrongfulness and defectiveness. Also see 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 293 as regards wrongfulness as a requirement to 
establish manufacturers' liability.  
588  S 61(4)(a). 
589  S 61(4)(b). 
590  S 61(4)(b)(i). 
591  S 61(4)(b)(ii). 
592  S 61(4)(c). Also see Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 447 where they argue that a subjective test 
is adopted to establish whether the distributor or retailer acted reasonably. 
593  S 61(4)(d)(i) read together with S 61(5)(a). 
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(ii) the earliest time at which a person had knowledge594 about an illness of any 
natural person;595 
(iii) the earliest time at which a person with an interest in any property had 
knowledge of the material facts about the loss of or damage to that 
property;596 
(iv) the latest date on which a person suffered economic loss.597 
 
The last defence makes provision for prescription. It is not clear which prescription 
period would apply if more than one option is available. The latest date should 
apply.598 
 
Some legal experts argue that Section 61 does not in actual fact concern strict 
product liability, as Section 61(4)(c) (the South African version of the so-called 
"development risk" defence in Europe) indirectly brings fault into play.599 Section 
61(4) provides for exemption from liability of particular persons who may otherwise 
be liable in terms of Section 61 (that is, the producer or importer, distributor, retailer 
and possibly a service provider). Section 61(4)(c) contains an exemption when "it is 
unreasonable to expect the distributor or retailer to have discovered the unsafe 
product …", but does not mention the other members of the supply chain. The 
intention of the legislature is unclear. Is it the intention to exempt the producer or the 
importer from liability (even should it have been reasonable for them to have 
discovered the defect), but where it was unreasonable for the distributor or the 
retailer to have discovered it?600 Or is it the intention to reserve the Section 61(4)(c) 
defence for distributors or retailers (because they, for instance, do not have as much 
control over the production of the product), and to exclude producers and importers 
                                                 
594  As regards knowledge, Van Zijl v Hoogenhout 2005 2 SA 93 (SCA) held that prescription runs 
from the date on which a plaintiff acquired meaningful knowledge that a defendant is to be 
blamed. Prior to this case prescription started running the moment when a fact was first brought 
to a plaintiff's knowledge. 
595  S 61(4)(d)(ii) read together with S 61(5)(b). 
596  S 61(4)(d)(iii) read together with S 61(5)(c). 
597  S 61(4)(d)(iv) read together with S 61(5)(d). 
598  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 451–452 on prescription. 
599  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 446–451 on the "development risk" defence. 
600  Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 447 on the "development risk" defence with special reference to 
the technical problem of how the exemption in S 71(3)(c) of the Draft Consumer Protection Bill of 
2006 was worded. The wording changed, but the uncertainty still remains in the Act. 
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from the defence? And if so, it is uncertain why importers are also excluded from the 
defence, as they have less control over the production process than producers. 
 
Section 61(6) confirms the authority of a court to: 
 
(a) determine whether any harm has been proven and adequately mitigated;601 
(b) assess the extent and monetary value of any damages, including economic 
loss;602 or 
(c) apportion liability amongst persons who are jointly and severally liable under 
Section 61.603 
 
The Act does not make provision for contributory negligence on the part of the 
consumer.604 
 
A supplier may be limited or exempted from liability for loss caused by his, her or its 
negligence, but not for loss caused by his, her or its gross negligence.605 However, a 
supplier cannot contract himself, herself or itself out of strict product liability. As 
mentioned supra, negligence is not required on the part of the supplier to establish 
liability under Section 61.606 
 
Apart from all the other precautions that suppliers would have to take into 
consideration in view of the soon-to-be-implemented strict product liability, it would 
be imperative to take out sufficient product liability insurance.607 Only time will tell 
whether strict product liability as imposed by the Act meets the objectives set out in 
the Wagener case.608 
                                                 
601  See S 61(6)(a). 
602  See S 61(6)(b). 
603  See S 61(6)(c). 
604  See Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 452 on contributory negligence. Their remarks are also 
relevant to S 55(5)(a) should consumers have blatantly ignored patent defects. 
605  S 51(1)(c); and see the discussion in 3.7.4 in the article. Moosajee Financial Mail 113. 
606  S 61(1); and see the discussion in 3.8.9 in the article. 
607  Maphosa 2009 Without Prejudice 36–37. 
608  Paras 298–300. Again, see Loubser and Reid 2006 Stell LR 415. 
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3.9 The supplier's accountability to consumers609 
 
3.9.1 Lay-by sales610 
 
A "lay-by" refers to an agreement in which the supplier agrees to sell goods to a 
consumer, accept the purchase price in periodic instalments, and retain the goods 
until the full price has been paid.611 Until the consumer takes possession of the 
goods, the instalments paid remain the property of the consumer612 subject to 
Section 65 of the Act613 and the supplier bears the risk of such goods.614 The money 
may not, for example, be used to sustain the supplier's cash flow, because the 
instalments are to be held in trust for the consumer. Suppliers may have to insure 
goods sold under lay-by until the consumer takes delivery thereof in view that the 
supplier bears the risk of the goods until they are delivered to the consumer. 
 
If the supplier is unable to deliver the goods when the consumer has paid the full 
purchase price, he, she or it must (at the option of the consumer) either: 
 
(a) supply the consumer with a corresponding amount of goods that are similar or 
better;615 or 
(b) refund the consumer  
(i) all the monies paid, with interest616 should the supplier have been unable to 
supply the goods owing to circumstances beyond his, her or its control617 
(this does not apply in cases in which the shortage results from a failure by 
the supplier to sufficiently and diligently carry out ordinary or routine 
                                                 
609  Chp 2 Part I paras 62–67. 
610  S 62. The predecessor is the Lay-by Regulations under the Sale and Services Matters Act 25 of 
1964, GN in GG 7068 R1234 of 13 June 1980 as amended by GN R1814 in GG 7200 of 29 
August 1980. See also the discussion in Otto 1992 De Jure. 
611  S 62(1). 
612  S 62(1)(a). 
613  See S 65 on the supplier's duty to hold, and account for, the consumer's property, and the 
discussion in 3.9.4 in the article. 
614  S 62(1)(b). 
615  S 62(2)(a). 
616  S 62(2)(b)(i). Interest is to be paid in accordance with the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 
1975. 
617  S 62(2)(b)(i). 
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matters in regard to his, her or its business, for example, failing to order 
stock);618 
(ii) double the amount paid by the consumer as compensation for breach of 
contract in all circumstances in which the inability to supply was not due to 
circumstances beyond the supplier's control.619  
 
This is an example of the manner in which the Act expands the consumer's rights 
that existed under the common law for breach of contract by the supplier. 
 
Should the consumer cancel the lay-by agreement before full payment of the 
purchase price, or default by not paying the full purchase price within sixty business 
days after the anticipated date of completion:620  
 
(a) the supplier may charge a termination penalty, provided that the supplier 
informed the consumer of the fact and the extent of the penalty before the 
consumer entered into the lay-by agreement;621 (The penalty may not be 
charged should the consumer's failure have been due to death or hospitalisation 
of the consumer.622 The Minister may prescribe a formula for calculating the 
maximum amount of the penalty.)623 
(b) the supplier may deduct the cancellation penalty from the monies already paid 
by the consumer and must then refund the consumer the remainder of the 
money.624 
 
The supplier must allow the consumer who defaults by not paying the full purchase 
price sixty days after the anticipated date of completion before he, she or it imposes 
a cancellation fee. That is a long period to wait for finalisation of the matter. 
 
3.9.2 Prepaid certificates, credit and vouchers625 
                                                 
618  S 62(3). 
619  S 62(2)(b)(ii). 
620  S 62(4).  
621  S 62(5)(b). 
622  S 62(5)(a). 
623  S 62(6). 
624  S 62(4)(b). 
625  S 63. 
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Section 63 applies to a transaction in which a supplier: 
 
(a) accepts consideration626 from a person (which is a wider term than the term 
"consumer")627 in exchange for a prepaid certificate, card, credit, voucher or 
similar device;628 and 
(b) expressly or implicitly agrees (it appears that "implicitly" should have been 
"tacitly" because it is unclear how one can agree to do something implicitly)629 to 
provide goods or services to any person who tenders the above-mentioned 
devices up to the value represented by it.630 
 
The section does not apply in respect of a device referred to in Section 63(1), or the 
value represented by it, after the total value of the device has been exchanged for 
goods, services or future access to services.631 
 
Section 63(2) provides that a prepaid certificate, card, credit, voucher or similar 
device does not expire before the earlier of: 
 
(a) the date on which its total value has been redeemed in exchange for goods or 
services or future access to services (these devices may no longer contain a 
term that provides that no change is given);632 or 
(b) three years after date of issue, or at the end of a longer or extended period 
agreed by the supplier at any time.633 (Many devices on the market today expire 
within six months of date of issue, which will no longer be acceptable under the 
Act.) 
 
Suppliers who issue these devices must hold the consideration received in trust for 
the benefit of the bearer of the device to the extent that the device has not yet been 
                                                 
626  S 1 sv "consideration". 
627  S 1 sv "consumer"; and "person".  
628  S 63(1)(a). 
629  See Cornelius Principles 158 on the distinction between tacit and implicit contract terms. 
630  S 63(1)(b). 
631  S 63(1). 
632  S 63(2)(a). 
633  S 63(2)(b). 
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redeemed in exchange for goods, services or future access to services.634 The 
consideration remains the property of the person in possession of the device. 
Section 63(3) does not contain a direct reference to Section 65. The supplier's duty 
to hold and account for the consumer's property under Section 65 would be 
applicable here, although Section 63(3) refers to the wider term "bearer of the … 
device" and not to the term "consumer" that is again used in Section 65.635 
 
3.9.3 Prepaid services and access to service facilities636 
 
In a case in which a consumer, in terms of an agreement, must pay (a) a once-off or 
periodic membership fee or any similar levy;637 or (b) an amount for services or 
access to services to be provided at a date more than twenty-five business days 
after the payment is made (this subsection excludes prepayment devices 
contemplated in Section 63),638 such amount remains the property of the consumer 
until the supplier makes a charge against it as contemplated in Section 64(2).639 A 
membership contract at a gym is an example of where Section 64 would apply.640 
Section 64(1) does not contain a direct reference to Section 65, but the supplier's 
duty to hold and account for the consumer's property would again be applicable 
here.641 Section 64(2) provides that a supplier may make a pro-rata charge against 
the consumer's money once a month, as required to pay for the following month's 
membership or service. 
 
In a case in which a facility to which the supplier contractually undertook to provide 
future access to a consumer is going to close down, and the supplier does not make 
available a reasonably accessible alternative facility, the supplier is obliged to:642 
 
                                                 
634  S 63(3).  
635  S 65; and see the discussion in 3.9.4 in the article. 
636  S 64. 
637  S 64(1)(a). 
638  S 64(1)(b). 
639  S 64(1). 
640  A few years ago, many consumers lost their (prepaid) membership fees when a major group of 
gyms ran into financial difficulty and were closed down. 
641  See S 65 and the discussion in 3.9.4 in the article. 
642  S 64(3). 
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(a) give the consumer at least forty days' written notice of the intended closure;643 
and 
(b) refund to the consumer any money belonging to him/her in terms of Section 64 
within five business days after closure of the facility.644  
 
This would apply irrespective of whether it is an involuntary closure of the facility, for 
example, due to sequestration, liquidation or insolvency.645 If a supplier is, for 
instance, liquidated, the liquidator of the estate would have to comply with Section 
64(3)(b).646 It is uncertain whether this would be feasible in practice. 
 
It appears that the notice of closure and refund is not necessary in a case in which 
the supplier makes available a reasonably accessible alternative facility to the 
consumer. "Reasonably accessible" appears to refer to the fact that the alternative 
facility must be within a reasonable distance from the facility to be closed. The 
section does not require that the alternative facility be of similar or superior nature to 
the facility to be closed, and this may be to the detriment of the consumer, who might 
then have to continue with the service agreement (for at least some period) at the 
inferior facility. 
 
3.9.4 The supplier's duty to hold and account for the consumer's property647 
 
Section 65(2) provides that in the instance in which a supplier has possession of any 
prepayment, deposit, membership fee, other money or any other property belonging 
to, or usually under the control of the consumer,648 the supplier: 
 
(a) must not deal with the property as if it is his, her or its own;649 (The supplier 
therefore keeps the property in trust for the consumer. Must a separate trust 
account be opened? Would the supplier be expected to pay any interest 
                                                 
643  S 64(3)(a). 
644  S 64(3)(b). 
645  S 64(4). 
646  S 65(3) and the discussion in 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 in the article. 
647  S 65.  
648  Ss 62–64; also see the discussions of these sections in 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.9.4 for examples in 
which a supplier has possession of prepayments, deposits, membership fees, other money or 
any other property belonging to, or usually under the control of, the consumer. 
649  S 65(2)(a). 
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accumulated on that money to the consumer? This subsection places a heavy 
administrative burden on the supplier, and one that would also be accompanied 
by many extra costs towards banking and bookkeeping.) 
(b) must exercise the care, diligence and skill that can reasonably be expected of 
person managing property belonging to another person;650 and (It is uncertain 
whether a supplier would be expected to act in the same manner as a financial 
intermediary, a trustee, an administrator, an executor or a liquidator; a very high 
degree of skill seems to be expected of the supplier.) 
(c) is liable to the owner of the property for any loss resulting from a failure to 
comply with Section 65(2)(a)–(b).651 
 
Section 65(2) does not apply652 to a supplier that is a bank,653 a mutual bank,654or 
any other financial institution that is similarly licensed and authorised to conduct 
business and take deposits from the public under national legislation.655  
 
Section 65(3) deals with persons who assume control of a supplier's property as 
administrator, executor or liquidator of an estate (was it in oversight that a trustee is 
not mentioned? It is uncertain whether a trustee would also have these duties).656 
Such persons have a duty to the consumer: 
 
(a) to carefully investigate whether there is any money or other property belonging 
to the consumer that is in the possession of the supplier;657 and 
(b) to oversee that such money or property is dealt with in compliance with Section 
65 to the benefit of the consumer.658 
 
                                                 
650  S 65(2)(b). 
651  S 65(2)(c). 
652  S 65(1). 
653  As defined in the Banks Act 94 of 1990; see S 65(1)(a). 
654  As defined in the Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993; see S 65(1)(b). 
655  S 65(1)(c). Attorneys, who may collect trust funds under the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 would, eg, 
be exempted from S 65(2). 
656  S 65(3)(a). 
657  S 65(3)(a)(i). 
658  S 65(3)(a)(ii). 
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The person in control of the supplier's estate is also liable for any loss to the 
consumer,659 unless he, she or it acted in good faith660 and without knowing of the 
existence of the consumer's interest.661 
 
3.9.5 Deposits in respect of containers, pallets or similar objects662 
 
The Minister may prescribe a minimum or maximum deposit that a supplier must or 
may require a consumer to pay in respect of the return of a container or similar 
object used for the packaging or delivery of goods.663 
 
If a person (note, again the use of the wider term "person" instead of "consumer") 
returns a container or object contemplated in Section 66(1), the supplier must pay 
that person the amount of the deposit: 
 
(a) if any, that is required to be charged under any public regulation on the date on 
which the object is returned to the supplier;664 or 
(b) that the supplier charged for that object, or ordinarily charges for such an 
object.665 
 
The person returning the container may return the object to any supplier and receive 
the deposit paid, irrespective of whether such person paid a deposit to that 
supplier.666 This is another section that entails a cost implication for the supplier. 
 
3.9.6 The return of parts and materials667 
 
When a service provider is authorised to perform a service to goods or property of 
the consumer or ordinarily under the control of the consumer, he, she or it must:668 
                                                 
659  S 65(3)(b). 
660  S 65(3)(b)(i). 
661  S 65(3)(b)(ii). 
662  S 66. 
663  S 66(1). 
664  S 66(2)(a). 
665  S 66(2)(b). 
666  S 66(2). 
667  S 67. 
668  S 67(1). 
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(a) keep the parts or components that he, she or it removed from the goods;669 
(b) store the parts or components separate from parts that were removed from other 
goods; and670 
(c) return the parts or components to the consumer in a reasonably clean 
container,671 
(d) unless the consumer rejected the return of the parts or components. 
 
It is not clear why the Act in addition to goods refers to property. This appears 
unnecessary, as property is included under the definition of "goods". 
 
Section 67 provides for the return of the parts and materials to the consumer. Firstly, 
the parts remain the consumer's property, and it is, for example, the consumer's right 
to sell the parts to a second-hand dealer. Secondly, when the service provider 
returns the parts to the consumer, it may serve as a confirmation to the consumer of 
the service/s that was/were performed. A supplier may, before the service is 
performed, obtain the consumer's consent not to return the parts.672 It appears that a 
supplier does not need to comply with Section 67(1) should the consumer have 
declined the return of the parts. 
 
Section 67(2) confirms that Section 67 does not apply to any part, substance or 
component that is required: 
 
(a) in terms of a warranty under which the service was performed, to be returned to 
or disposed of according to the instructions of the producer or distributor;673 
(b) in terms of an insurance claim under which the service was performed, to be 
returned to or disposed of according to the instructions of the insurer;674 or 
(c) in terms of any public regulation, to be recovered or disposed of in a safe 
manner in the interests of environmental safety or public health and safety.675 
                                                 
669  S 67(1)(a). 
670  S 67(1)(b). 
671  S 67(1)(c). 
672  S 67(1). 
673  S 67(2)(a). 
674  S 67(2)(b). 
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4 Conclusion 
 
The article has illustrated that the Act is written in favour of the consumer. Various 
provisions of the Act make inroads into the common-law position to strengthen the 
position of the consumer vis-à-vis the supplier. Undoubtedly, suppliers are facing an 
onerous task to prepare to comply, and eventually attempt to comply, with the Act.676 
Reviewing current practices and agreements and replacing them with new ones hold 
a huge cost implication for suppliers. Add to that the cost of training staff and 
employing extra staff to enforce the Act, as well as more extensive liability insurance. 
In addition, suppliers' product and service costs would no doubt also increase. Such 
increases would eventually filter through to the consumer. From a consumer's point 
of view, the Act is, however, to be welcomed, as it will contribute to the eradication of 
many exploitative practices in the marketplace. 
                                                                                                                                                        
675  S 67(2)(c). Also see S 59 on the recovery and safe disposal of designated products or 
components; and the discussion in 3.8.7 in the article. 
676  See Maphosa 2009 Without Prejudice 36–37. 
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